Accounting conservatism and divestitures. by Yang, Shuo. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Business Administration.
Accounting Conservatism and Divestitures 
YANQ Shuo 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Philosophy 
in 
Accountancy 







Professor Young, Danqing (Chair) 
Professor Zhuang, Zili (Thesis Supervisor) 
Professor Tsang, Albert (Committee Member) 
Professor Wu, Donghui (External Examiner) 
t 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Title Page i 
Thesis/Assessment Committee ii 
Table ofContents iii 
List ofTables iv 
Abstract (English) v 
Abstract (Chinese) vi 
Chapter 1 Introduction 1 
Chapter 2 Background Literature 6 
2.1 Divestiture Literature 6 
2.2 Conservatism and Investment Efficiency Literature 9 
Chapter 3 Hypothesis Development 13 
3.1 Conservatism's Effect on Divestitures through 
Debtholders Channel 14 
3.2 Conservatism's Effect on Divestitures through 
Equityholders Channel 16 
3.3 Conservatism and Disclosure of Use of Proceeds 
from Divestitures 18 
Chapter 4 Sample Selection 22 
Chapter 5 Research Design 27 
Chapter 6 Empirical Results 34 
6.1 Univariate Analysis 34 
6.2 Timely Loss Recognition and Selling Firm 
Market Reaction to Divestiture Announcement 40 
6.3 Timely Loss Recognition and Selling Firm 
Post-divestiture Performance Change 41 
6.4 Timely Loss Recognition and Non-disclosure 
ofUse ofProceeds 42 
Chapter 7 Sensitivity Tests 43 
Chapter 8 Conclusions 45 
References 47 
Appendix A Accounting Treatment of Disposal of Assets and Special Items 52 




Table 1 Sample Distribution by Announcement Year 57 
Table 2 Summary Statistics 58 
Table 3 Pearson (above)/Spearman (below) Correlations 61 
Table 4 Car and Post-divestiture Performance Change 
based on Reason Breakdown 62 
Table 5 Car and Post-divestiture Performance Change 
based on Proceeds Breakdown 65 
Table 6 OLS Regression of the Relation between Selling Firm 
Announcement Car and Conservatism 67 
Table 7 OLS Regression of the Relation between Selling Firm 
Post-divestiture Performance Change and Conservatism 69 • 
Table 8 TLR Models with Interactions ofNon-disclosure of Proceeds 75 
iv 
Abstract of thesis entitled 
The paper investigates how accounting conservatism affects the relation between 
firm's divestitures and shareholder value and firm performance. On one hand, 
accounting conservatism can speed up bad news recognition and force manager to 
dispose money-losing projects more quickly and deploy capital more efficiently, 
which is positively related to shareholder value and firm performance. On the other 
hand, because of the lower threshold of identifying bad news, accounting 
conservatism could lead to false alarm and early liquidation of a project even when it 
is a positive NPV project, and accounting conservatism should be negatively related 
to shareholder value and firm performance. The paper uses divestitures from SDC 
database and hand-collects divestiture reasons and use of proceeds through searching 
for press releases and news reports from Factiva, and explicitly tests how accounting 
conservatism would influence the outcome of divestitures. Consistent with 
conservatism affecting real economic activities, I find the negative relation between 
conservatism and divestiture outcome in performance-related divestitures, but not in 
other kinds of divestitures (non-performance-related divestitures). Moreover, how 
conservatism works on divestitures is actually conditional on the disclosure of use of 
proceeds from asset sales. The negative relations between conservatism and 
divestitures are mostly driven by firms that do not disclose use of proceeds, 
suggesting that conservatism works negatively on divestitures when firms have no 
better alternatives with the freed capital. 
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This paper examines how financial reporting affects real economic activities, more 
specifically, how accounting conservatism, as an important accounting property that 
receives increasing attention in academic researches, affects investment efficiency 
through divesting existing projects. Watts (2003) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
argue that managers are reluctant to terminate unprofitable projects because they are 
reluctant to admit they make bad investment decisions to begin with and they have 
limited ability to run the projects profitably. Conservative accounting system 
recognizes bad news timelier, therefore forces managers to divest money-losing 
assets. On the other hand, FASB claims that conservatism biases information flow 
and could potentially mislead investors. Consistent with this argument, Li (2009) and 
Gigler et al (2009) show that conservatism negatively affects investment efficiency 
because good projects sometimes could be mistaken as bad projects. Although there 
are other papers trying to examine empirically how conservatism influences 
termination of projects, those papers do not specifically assess individual divestiture 
deal, and the economic consequences related to the divestiture. Also, those papers do 
not show whether the projects are really terminated because oftheir bad performance. 
In this paper, I am able to differentiate whether a project is divested for its bad 
performance by collecting the divestiture reason through searching Factiva. I also 
directly link conservatism and economic consequences related to divestiture, using 
the Basu (1997) model to test the relations between firm's conservatism level and 
market reaction to divestiture announcement, and firm's conservatism level and 
post-divestiture performance change. Furthermore, I also find that conservatism does 
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not affect the outcome of divestitures single-handedly; in fact, this paper suggests 
that conservatism's effect on divestitures is conditional on the disclosure of use of 
proceeds from divestitures, indicating that conservatism as a corporate governance 
mechanism interacts with other mechanisms to influence corporate investment 
efficiency. 
Conservative accounting could help shareholders and board of directors identify 
negative NPV projects by speeding up the recognition of bad news, and consequently 
lead to more timely dismissal of opportunistically behaving managers and 
termination of money-losing projects ex-post and deter managers from taking bad 
projects ex-ante (Watts, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Consistent with this 
argument, Francis and Martin (2010) find that firms with more conservative 
accounting tend to make more profitable acquisition deals measured by market 
reaction to acquisition announcement and post-acquisition firm performance, 
providing evidence on the ex-ante effect of conservatism. Commenting on this paper, 
Roychowdhury (2010) contends that existing projects have more intuitive relation 
with conservatism than acquisitions of projects firms do not already have, and it must 
be the case that firms make acquisitions solely based on the consideration ofeamings 
impact for Francis and Martin (2010)'s argument to stand. He also argues that 
conservatism could possibly lead to underinvestment because managers are 
risk-averse if Francis and Martin (2010)'s logic is right. Therefore, this paper is 
trying to investigate the ex-post part of the argument of Watts (2003) and Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005). 
There are other papers examining the ex-post argument, but they generally do not 
examine divestitures directly. Frankel and Roychowdhury (2009) and Srivastava and 
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Tse (2009) find results consistent with the idea that timely loss recognition could lead 
to early termination of negative NPV projects. Specifically, Frankel and 
Roychowdhury (2009) argue that firms with conservative accounting terminate 
money-losing projects more timely, so once they recognize large negative special 
items due to the project termination in one year, chances are they are unlikely to 
record other large negative special items of similar amount in the next year; in other 
words, negative special items reverse faster for more conservative firms. For less 
conservative firms, the charges with discontinued projects are spread out over time, 
so negative special items are more likely to persist. However, the paper is still in the 
same spirit of Basu (1997) that shows generally bad news does not persist for 
conservative firms. More importantly, how the timely termination of bad projects 
affects firm performance and shareholder value is unanswered. Srivastava and Tse 
(2009) compare two groups of firms that have similar size and investment 
opportunities in the same industry, with one group having non-zero "discontinued 
operations" item and the other having zero "discontinued operations" item. They 
argue that similar firms when faced with similar industry-specific economic shocks, 
more conservative firms are more likely to end unprofitable projects; therefore they 
are more likely to have a non-zero "discontinued operations" item. Besides, their 
paper classifies firais with gain on discontinued operations as timely termination and 
large loss on discontinued operations as late termination. This approach, however, is 
somewhat problematic. They assume firms usually divest assets of their main 
industry, but actually most firms divest non-core businesses just to refocus on their 
main industry. Comment and Jarrell (1995) document a systematic pattern of firms 
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undoing diversification in recent years. Also, many assets are not disposed because 
of their bad performance. 
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However, both Li (2009) and Gigler et al (2009) cast doubt on the role of 
conservatism on investment efficiency. In their theoretical setting, once receiving a 
bad accounting signal, debtholders have the right to liquidate projects and claim the 
cash flows. When it comes to liquidation decision, potentially there are two types of 
errors, specifically, failing to detect poor projects and wrongly liquidating good 
projects (false alarm). Based on Basu (1997)'s definition of accounting conservatism, 
the verification standard for recognizing good news is higher than bad news; 
implicitly, conservatism means that bad news is not as informative as good news now 
that bad news is verified using a much looser standard, and good news is actually 
more likely to be real good news when conservatism is in place. Kim and Pevzner 
(2010) support the informational effect of conservatism, showing that market reacts 
stronger to good earnings news and weaker to bad earnings news. Gigler et al. (2009) 
use a vivid example of school's grading system and screening of good and bad 
students. Under a very tough grading system, even good students could sometime be 
classified as bad students, but the students who are classified as good are more likely 
to be really good. The same logics work for identifying good projects and bad 
projects as well. With conservative accounting, even good projects could be wrongly 
taken as bad projects because of the less informativeness ofbad news. Both Li (2008) 
and Gigler et al (2009) use the losses from failing to liquidate bad projects and losses 
from wrongly liquidating good projects to measure the efficiency of debt contracts, 
and conclude that under certain circumstances false alarm and early liquidation of 
good projects due to conservative accounting outweigh the benefits of detecting bad 
projects, therefore, conservatism is actually harmful for debt contracting efficiency. 
Besides conservatism in debt contracting, Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) show 
that there is a shareholder demand for conservatism as well. Shareholders also expect 
managers to select positive NPV projects and dispose the money-losing ones, 
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therefore, how conservatism affects early or late liquidation of projects are also 
relevant to shareholders, not just debtholders. Board of directors could also enforce 
liquidation of bad projects once they notice the bad accounting signal of the projects 
just like debtholders, and accounting conservatism has the same informational role 
on shareholders and debtholders, which means that bad news is less informative and 
good news is more informative. As a result, when conservatism enhances the 
probability of terminating bad projects by managers or board of directors, it 
simultaneously enhances the probability of wrongly terminating good projects by 
managers or board of directors, just as the debtholders do in Li (2009) and Gigler et 
al (2009)'s models. Empirically speaking, unlike the theoretical models in Li (2009) 
and Gigler et al (2009), it is impossible to determine whether debtholders or 
equityholders initiate divestitures, but the informational role of conservatism work 
through debtholders and equityholders on divestitures in the same manner. Therefore, 
it is an interesting empirical question to investigate how conservatism will affect the 
divestiture efficiency，namely, whether conservatism increases shareholder value and 
firm performance through curbing the managerial discretions or decreases 
shareholder value and firm performance through biased information. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 goes through both the 
divestiture literature and conservatism and investment efficiency literature. Chapter 3 
develops the hypotheses. I discuss the sample selection and research design in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5，respectively. Empirical results are presented in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 7 is the sensitivity tests. Chapter 8 concludes the paper. I describe the 
• 
accounting treatment of disposal of assets and issues with special items in Appendix 




SECTION 2.1 DIVESTITURE LITERATURE 
Divestiture literature belongs to the larger merger and acquisition literature, and in 
fact, asset sales could be viewed as partial merger (Jain, 1985). Similar to targets in 
M&A deals, selling firms are usually the winners in the deal and capture most of the 
gains from value creation while acquirers only experience modest positive qr 
insignificant abnormal retum (Jain, 1985; Alexander et al.，1984; Hite et al., 1987; 
Andrade et al, 2001). 
However, difference exists between M&A deals and asset sale deals. In M&A deals, 
equity as payment is a bad signal for acquirer firm's stock value and negatively 
related to acquirer announcement stock retum (Travlos, 1987; Andrade et al., 2001); 
however, in asset sale deals, equity as payment creates more value for both sellers 
and buyers than cash deals, because the single fact that sellers are willing to accept 
buyers' stocks signals that sellers have good expectation about the synergy the 
divested assets and the buying firms are going to create in the future after the deal is 
done (Slovin et al, 2005). 
As for the underlying reasons for asset sales, there are different hypotheses with 
diverse implications. The three major hypotheses are efficiency hypothesis, financing 
hypothesis, and information hypothesis. 
Hite et al (1987) clearly raise the efficient deployment hypothesis of asset sales. They 
argue that firms sell asset to others because the buyers could more efficiently operate 
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the assets than themselves, so buyers are willing to offer good price for the divested 
assets and the sellers capture partial efficiency gains from the transactions. They also 
contend that firms might be financially constrained but have unfunded positive NPV 
projects, so they sell assets in order to provide capital for those projects. 
However, Lang et al. (1995) raises the financing hypothesis and questions the 
efficient deployment of capital hypothesis by arguing that if firms only sell assets for 
efficiency reasons, then the market reaction should not be conditional on the use of 
proceeds. However, market reaction is much larger when proceeds are used to pay 
down debt. Their explanation is that managers sell assets to attain easy financing, and 
this way of financing avoids scrutiny on the use of money by capital market, 
therefore market views deals whose proceeds are retained within the firm as less 
favorable because market suspects that managers might use the proceeds to pursue 
their own self-interests. Bates (2005) provides further evidence on market reaction 
and the use of proceeds. He shows that retention of proceeds increases in growth 
opportunities, although retaining firms tend to overinvest after the asset sales, 
consistent with both the argument that firms sell assets to finance their own unfunded 
positive NPV projects and the argument that managers retain proceeds to pursue their 
own objectives. He also finds that market reacts positively only when proceeds are 
used to pay down debt, but not to repurchase and special dividends, which means 
that not general payout of proceeds increases shareholder value, only paying back 
debt does by decreasing the agency cost of debt. 
t 
Another hypothesis is related with information asymmetry and misevaluation. Chen 
and Zhang (2007) find that multi-segment firms selling one of their segments have 
positive market reaction even when the earnings expectations of selling firms stay 
7 
the same. Their theory is that investors suspect multi-segment firms will shift 
earnings across different segments, so they will try to undo the shifting on their own, 
but sometimes that will lead to undervaluation since investors do not know exactly 
the amount being shifted. Firms make a commitment of not shifting earnings by 
selling a segment to restore the misevaluation, and the deal has nothing to do with 
the profitability of divested segment. 
However, despite different hypotheses, one thing worth emphasizing is that it is not. 
necessarily the case that firms are always selling the most unprofitable or 
unproductive assets. Commenting on an asset sale in which El Paso Corp sells its 
Energy Bridge LNG business to Excelerate Energy LLC, Credit Lyonnais Securities 
analyst Gordon Howald said, "The Catch 22 is that the stuff that you can sell easily is 
probably your better assets". Consistent with this anecdotal evidence, Schlingemann 
et al. (2002) find that market liquidity is very important for divestitures decisions in 
terms of which segment to divest, and worst-performing segment is less likely to be 
divested than most liquid one. 
As to the economic consequences related to asset sales, John and Ofek (1995) find 
that announcement retums are greater for firms who enhance their focus, and 
operating performance increase is primarily driven by focus-increasing firms. 
Besides, there is a well-known literature called diversification discount. Dittmar and 
Shivdasani (2003) suggest that diversification discount decreases after divestitures, 
and this decrease in diversification discount is related to more efficient investment 
for the remaining assets following divestitures. However, as Colak and Whited (2007) 
comment, firms' asset sales decisions and the following performance, valuation and 
investment efficiency changes are endogenous. It is especially true when most of 
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asset sales do not occur in isolation and asset sale decisions are always bundled with 
a lot of other news. Many asset sales belong to a restructuring program that is meant 
to change the firm's corporate strategy dramatically. In other words, asset sales 
respond to broader changes in firms' internal or external environment (Dittmar and 
Shivdasani, 2003). 
When most of the asset sales papers focus on how asset sales would affect firm 
operating performance and firm value, Warusawitharana (2008) builds a theoretical 
model to investigate the determinants of asset purchases and asset sales decisions. 
The model and the empirical test show that firm size and profitability could predict 
asset purchases and asset sales decisions, and profitable firms purchase assets and 
increase their size while not so profitable firms sell assets and downsize, a result 
consistent with efficient investment decisions. Similarly, Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2001) use transactions of plants to show that asset sales improve allocation of 
resources. Both papers seem to reject the agency-based theory of asset purchases and 
asset sales. It is also consistent with the evidence that usually firms experiencing 
negative performance and liquidity constraint choose to sell assets, and firms' 
abnormal retum before asset sales tend to be negative (Gordon et al, 1984; Jain, 
1985). 
SECTION 2.2 CONSERVATISM AND INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY 
LITERATURE 
Good quality accounting helps reduce information asymmetry between firm insiders 
and outside investors and cost of capital, therefore alleviates firms' financial 
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constraint and improves investment efficiency. Biddle and Hilary (2006) and Biddle, 
Hilary and Verdi (2009) prove that accounting quality measured by accruals quality 
is positively related to investment efficiency. 
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Accounting conservatism, as an important accounting attribute, is argued to be able 
to improve investment efficiency beyond the general earnings quality. Kothari et al 
(2009) use a special setting to prove that in general managers like to withhold bad 
news. Conservatism, however, rushes bad news forward against managers' wishes. 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) contend that with conservative accounting, on one hand, 
managers abstain from investing in negative projects because the losses from those 
projects would show up really quickly within their tenure, on the other han(J, 
managers will act more quickly to limit losses once projects indeed tum out to be bad. 
Both the ex-ante and ex-post effects of conservatism will work towards improving 
investment efficiency. 
Consistent with the ex-ante effect, Francis and Martin (2010) find that managers in 
more conservative firms make more profitable acquisition. They also have divestiture 
tests aimed at proving the ex-post effect; however, the design of their tests is a little 
rough. First of all, while over 40% acquisitions end up being divested later (Kaplan 
and Weisbach, 1992), it is not true the other way around. In fact, most asset sales are 
not former acquisitions, therefore, Francis and Martin (2010)'s divestiture tests only 
address a very limited subsample of a larger divestitures sample. Secondly, they do 
not really check deal by deal whether the divestiture is indeed a former acquisition, 
and they only rely on the same three-digit SIC code to assume that the divested 
business is the firm acquired before. Thirdly, when Watts (2003) and Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) argue that conservatism motivates quick response to losses, 
Francis and Martin (2010)'s divestiture tests do not even show whether divested 
assets are actually losing money. 
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In an international setting，Bushman el al (2006) shows that firms with more 
conservative accounting will reduce investment more when growth opportunities 
decrease, implying that conservative accounting prevents firms from overinvestment. 
In response to Roychowdhury (2010)'s critique of Francis and Martin (2010) on the 
conservatism, underinvestment and risk-aversion issue, Garcia Lara et al (2010) 
suggest that conservatism improve investment efficiency by both avoiding 
underinvestment and overinvestment, and there is no evidence that conservative 
firms take on less risk. They also find that conservatism is positively related to future 
performance. Ahmed and Duellman (2009) also find that conservatism is related to 
better future performance, not through the avoidance of underinvestment and 
overinvestment studied by Garcia Lara et al. (2010), but through the prevention of 
negative NPV projects ex-ante and quick response to terminate negative NPV 
projects ex-post as argued by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Watts (2003). They 
also find that conservative firms are less likely to have special items charges and 
have smaller magnitude of special items charges. However, Ahmed and Duellman 
(2009) do not directly link the better future performance to firais' conservatism level. 
Also, as Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and Garcia Lara et al (2009) show, accounting 
conservatism is associated with stronger boards, therefore accounting conservatism is 
possibly just a part of the entire corporate governance mechanism and associated 
with other governance devices, and it is hard to isolate the effect of conservatism. 
Another concem is about the special items charges. Firms sell assets for many other 
reasons than realizing that some projects are unproductive. In fact, some managers 
specifically claim that the assets they divest are actually profitable and have a lot of 
• 
potentials. Wu and Zhang (2009) find that in the international setting after firms 
voluntarily adopt US GAAP or IFRS, employment layoff becomes more sensitive to 
performance because those internationally recognized accounting standards are 
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generally more conservative. More conservative accounting leads to timely 
termination of underperforming units which in retum leads to timely layoff of 
employment. 
Srivastava and Tse (2009) compare two groups of firms matched on size and industry, 
with one group of firms having non-zero "Discontinued Operations" and the other 
group having zero "Discontinued Operations". They conclude that more conservative 
firms are more likely to have non-zero "Discontinued Operations" because they 
respond to the industry-specific shock. However, "Discontinued Operations" cannot 
differentiate whether a project is divested for its bad performance or the divestiture is 
even voluntary in the first place. Besides that, the paper does not show the favorable 
economic consequences related with so-called timely termination ofbad projects, 
like better performance or better market reaction to the divestiture announcement. 
On the other hand, Li (2009) and Gigler et al (2009) use theoretical models to 
analyze how conservatism will affect debt-contracting efficiency. In their models, 
debtholder receives accounting signal about the profitability of the project, and they 
have the options to either continue the project or liquidate the project immediately. 
Because conservative accounting lowers the threshold of recognizing bad news, bad 
news becomes less informative, and sometimes even good project could wrongly 
generate bad signal. The models use the losses from liquidating good project and 
failing to liquidate bad project to measure investment efficiency. Since investors have 
already taken on the project, the project is more likely to be a good project, and the 
loss from wrong liquidation outweighs that from failure to liquate bad project, so in 




While there are other studies that investigate accounting conservatism and timely 
termination of bad projects, they only show the "timely/early" part but do not show 
how and whether firm's performance increases following the termination. If early 
termination or delayed termination of projects generate no real economic difference, 
then what is so desirable about timely termination of projects after all? Ahmed and 
Duellman (2009) find that more conservative firms have better future profitability, 
but they cannot directly link the better future profitability to either the timely 
termination of bad projects ex-post or managers' tendency to invest in good projects 
ex-ante. In that sense, Francis and Martin (2010) proves the ex-ante argument, and 
this study intends to provide the evidence on the ex-post argument by directing 
looking at the asset sales deals rather than through special items. 
Accounting information as the verifiable hard information against which other 
information is assessed (LaFond and Watts, 2008), its attributes have real economic 
consequences, including cost of equity (Francis et al, 2004)，cost of debt (Ahmed et 
al, 2002; Zhang, 2008), CEO turnover decision (Engel, Hayes and Wang, 2003; Wu 
and Zhang, 2009), and investment efficiency (Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Biddle, 
Hilary and Verdi, 2009 etc). 
When it comes to firm's investment strategies, although maximizing firm value is the 
ultimate goal, it is not necessarily the case that firms make investment or divestment 
solely based on accounting earnings impact. Firms choose to acquire assets and 
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divest assets for multiple reasons. Actually, even acquisition deals, as Roychowdhury 
(2010) points out, are not necessarily made based solely on their future influence on 
earnings. Massa and Zhang (2009) in an interesting paper investigate the cosmetic 
mergers where buyers acquire firms whose investment styles are more popular with 
mutual funds so that buyers can boost the market value of their own firms. It is even 
more so with the divestment decisions. Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) and Lang et al 
(1995) both provide a list of reasons for divestitures claimed by managers or 
commented by financial analysts or business press. For accounting conservatism to 
really influence the divestitures decisions, it is easily understandable that only bad 
performance driven divestitures can be affected by accounting attributes. If projects 
are terminated for performance reasons, conservatism will be in place no matter 
whether debtholders are pressuring managers into this decisions or board of directors 
is urging the managers to do so as Watts (2003) suggests. 
SECTION 3.1 CONSERVATISM'S EFFECT ON DIVESTITURES THROUGH 
DEBTHOLDERS CHANNEL 
Debtholders, who cares about the principal and interests payments, definitely would 
like firms to liquidate poor performing projects more timely so that cash could be 
immediately generated and no more fiuther cash is bumt to fund these unproductive 
projects, safely guaranteeing the repayment of debt. Through the mechanism of 
accounting conservatism, debtholders receive negative signal more timely, and they 
are going to take protective actions quickly accordingly. Zhang (2008) shows that 
conservative firms are more likely to violate debt covenants; after violation of 
covenants, lenders immediately take different protective actions based on the nature 
of the contracts. Some lenders increase the interest rates, demand the immediate 
payback, or reduce borrowing base etc, all of which are extremely expensive for 
firms who just experience negative earnings shock. Bartov (1993) shows that 
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managers will time asset sales to raise eamings and cash so that they can avoid 
violating covenants. The following asset sale announcement by manager of Allied 
Product Corp vividly illustrates this point: "The company said the decision to divest 
White-New Idea was difficult in light of the fact that in 1993 the division finally 
returned to profitability. But it said it was essential for the company's future growth 
that it eliminate the restrictive covenants imposed by the senior lenders, and the sale 
of White-New Idea will permit the company to do that without turning to the 
high-yield bond market and incurring additional interest expense. Completion of this 
transaction will reduce total debt to 40% of total capitalization. Allied said it will use 
the proceeds from the sale to repay all of its obligations to its senior secured 
lenders, a group ofl3 banks headed by Continental Bank. Remaining funds will be 
used to repay certain other debt." In this case, the firm rather sells a profitable 
division than bearing the risk of violating the covenants; therefore，restrictive 
covenants combined with timely recognition of loss certainly play a role in asset sale 
decisions. However, whether covenants and timely recognition of loss pressure the 
managers into making the efficient divestment decision is less certain. Back to Allied 
Product Corp's case, on one hand, we can infer that the divested division is actually 
losing money for a while, so it is possible that debt overhang indeed motivates 
managers to terminate a project that has been a drag on the eamings; on the other 
hand, the divested division is actually profitable at the time it is being divested, so it 
is equally possible that debt overhang enforces the immature and inefficient 
liquidation. Li (2008) and Gigler et al. (2009) show that under certain circumstance, 
debtholders execute their liquidation decisions wrongly because conservative 
f 
accounting system is likely to trigger false alarm now that bad news is less 
informative because of the lower verification standards. The covenants along with 
conservatism could serve the monitoring role of debt, and motivate managers to sell 
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unproductive assets more timely and increase the investment efficiency; however, if 
the covenants are exceptionally restrictive and managers care too much about not 
violating covenants, it is still possible that managers terminate projects too early with 
timely recognition of losses and the intention of avoiding the violation of covenants 
or responding to the violation of covenants. Therefore, how debt and conservatism 
work together on divestiture decisions is an empirical question. 
SECTION 3.2 CONSERVATISM'S EFFECT ON DIVESTITURES THROUGH 
EQUITY SHAREHOLDERS CHANNEL 
Brown et al (1994) suggest, for financially distressed firms, creditors exert major 
influence directly on the asset sales and use of proceeds decisions. However, for 
firms in comparatively healthy conditions, it is unlikely that debtholders will enforce 
their liquidation right whenever they observe the negative signal or covenant is 
violated, and creditors are unlikely to directly influence managers as to when and 
which assets to sell, so in most cases it is highly possible that board of directors and 
managers make the divestiture decisions. While people tend to argue that debtholders 
demand conservatism because of their asymmetric payoff function and the existence 
of explicit debt contract, LaFond and Watts (2008) show that the information 
asymmetry between equity shareholders and firm is positively related to firm's 
conservatism level and changes in information asymmetry leads change in 
accounting conservatism, indicating that like stakeholder with explicit contracts, 
equity investors also demand conservatism. Managers are reluctant to admit that they 
make bad investment decisions or they do not have the ability to run certain assets 
profitably, therefore they have incentives to hide losses about some underperforming 
projects. Equity shareholders would like managers to devote their time and the 
corporate capital into the most productive projects to increase the firm value; 
therefore they prefer an accounting system that could timely reflect losses of 
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investment. Considering managers' tendency to withhold bad news, conservative 
accounting seems really desirable for equityholders. 
On the other hand, FASB has opposed to the conservatism as an accounting principle 
for a long time. FASB believes that financial information needs to be neutral and 
conservatism actually implies bias in accounting information by systematically 
understating net assets and profits, increases information asymmetry and misleads 
investors. 
Bartov (1993) documents that managers will time asset sales as a real earnings 
management device to smooth earnings, in other words, managers sell assets with the 
primary reason to boost an otherwise flat or negative earnings while the real quality 
of the projects might not be the major concem in this situation for the managers. As 
Roychowdhury (2010) implies, conservatism could make risk-averse managers take 
less risks. Selling assets could be viewed as a prudent, effective and easy way for 
risk-averse managers to boost earnings quickly. As Li (2009) and Gigler et al. (2009) 
suggest, conservatism sometimes generates false alarm, which means good projects 
could be mistaken for bad projects. With the real earnings management incentive in 
mind, however, risk-averse managers in conservative firms might immediately 
liquidate {de facto) good projects when the projects appear to be drag on firm's 
earnings so that they could sustain the desirable eamings level and avoid the bad 
consequences of missing variable eamings targets. Managers have limited horizon 
within the firm (Dechow and Sloan, 1991), and they care more about meeting the 
$ 
short-term target than creating value in the long mn by efficient investment. Under 
this circumstance, accounting conservatism could reinforce managers' real eamings 
management incentives and intensify risk-aversion issues of managers whenever 
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firms are in danger of not meeting earnings target, as a result, corporate resources are 
not efficiently deployed and in the long run firm value is being destroyed. 
When it comes to economic consequences, following Francis and Martin (2010), I 
use both market reaction to asset sales announcement and post-divestiture 
performance change as measures. If the bad project is timely terminated because of 
the conservatism so that no more future capital would be bumt to support this project, 
and management would focus their time, attention and the firm's resources on other 
profitable business, the market reaction towards the asset sales will be stronger and 
the post-divestiture performance will improve more (deteriorate less). If project is 
terminated prematurely and there is no better use for the saved resources, the market 
reaction will be smaller and the post-divestiture performance change will be worse. 
Hypothesis la: Market reaction to announcement of performance-related 
divestitures is related to firm's conservatism level; Market reaction to announcement 
of non- performance-related divestitures has no relation with firm's conservatism. 
Hypothesis lb: Post-divestiture performance change after performance-related 
divestitures is related to firm's conservatism level; Performance change after 
non-performance-related divestitures has no relation with firm's conservatism. 
SECTION 3.3 CONSERVATISM AND DISCLOSURE OF USE OF 
PROCEEDS FROM DIVESTITURES 
The efficiency of divestiture decisions is actually found to be related with the freed 
up capital, i.e. use of proceeds from the asset sale deals. Ideally, an underperforming 
project should be terminated and sold to a firm who could better run the assets and 
achieve efficiency, and the seller captures part of the gain through asset sales, and 
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deploys the capital into other good projects with promising opportunities (Hite et al, 
1987). However, in reality, proceeds are put into all kinds of use, like paying down 
debt and distribution, and sometimes are just kept within firms without particular use. 
Furthermore, use of proceeds from asset sales is one kind of voluntary disclosure, 
and actually most of the firms choose not to mention how they plan on using the 
money, making it harder for investors to assess the validity and efficiency of 
divestiture. Lang et al (1995) show that market reaction to asset sales are more 
favorable when the proceeds are used to pay down debt than when proceeds are 
retained by managers, implying the typical free cash flow problem. Bates (2005) find 
that even retaining proceeds within firms is not as opportunistic as Lang et al (1995) 
propose because he finds that the probability of retaining proceeds is increasing in 
firm's growth opportunity and future capital expenditure needs, and market reaction 
to asset sale announcement is increasing in net-of-industry investment level for firms 
with good growth opportunities. Therefore, appropriate use of proceeds from 
divestiture is almost as relevant to investment efficiency as the divestiture itself. If 
managers make proceeds from asset sales well accounted for, it could not only best 
deploy capital but also reduce the information asymmetry between insiders and 
investors and helpjustify the divestiture decision. 
Conservatism offers managers an opportunity to terminate potentially good projects 
so that they could keep the proceeds either to fund their own pet projects or serve 
other personal interests. I argue that under this circumstance accounting conservatism 
could even exacerbate the managerial discretion and free cash flow problem because 
« 
what is claimed to be bad projects by managers might not be bad, and this is 
especially so when managers cannot appropriately account for the use of proceeds. 
Asset sales could be viewed as an easy financing channel without too much scrutiny 
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from the capital market, for firms basically sell assets in exchange for money. Like 
IPOs/SEOs, the more commonly used financing methods, the use of proceeds is an 
important voluntary disclosure that could decrease information asymmetry between 
investors and insiders. Leone, Rock and Willenborg (2007) find that the specificity of 
use of proceeds in IPO prospectus is associated with less underpricing, indicating 
that voluntary disclosure helps reduce cost of equity. It would be in the investor's 
best interest if the managers liquidate an underperforming project and use the 
proceeds to pay down the debt and reduce (or eliminate, for some firms become 
basically debt-free after debt payback using proceeds from divestitures) the agency 
cost of debt and boost future earnings, or to directly pay out the money through 
special dividends or repurchases if there is no urgent need for cash and better 
opportunity within the firm, or to invest in the profitable projects by internal 
expansions or acquisitions. However, for managers who sell assets for no particular 
purpose other than receiving cash, it is hard for them to come up with an explanation 
about how they plan to do with the money. If managers are vague about the proceeds 
from divestitures, it is hard for investors to assess the validity of the divestiture 
decisions; therefore, investors might react less favorable towards doubtful 
divestitures. Consequently, the performance change after doubtful divestitures should 
also be less favorable, because managers might not put capital into better uses or 
even waste it entirely to extract private benefit of control, but with conservative 
accounting the projects being liquidated might not be really bad. In other words, 
asset divestitures are less desirable when managers liquidate projects but have no 
better alternative investment plan, and accounting conservatism exacerbates this 
undesirable effect. 
Hypothesis 2a: For performance-related asset sales, the relation between market 
20 丨. 
reaction and accounting conservatism will be more negative (or less positive) for 
firms who do not disclose the use of proceeds from asset sales than the relation for 
firms who do disclose the use of proceeds. 
Hypothesis 2b: For performance-related asset sales, the relation between 
post-divestiture performance change and accounting conservatism will be more 
negative (or less positive) for firms who do not disclose the use of proceeds from 





First I extract all the merger and acquisition deals between 1980 and 2008 from SDC 
database as long as target or target's parent is a US publicly traded firm. Then I select 
all the divestiture deals by selecting observations whose SDC variable ‘DIVEST’ has 
value of ‘Yes，. SDC sometimes has duplicate deals, and occasionally messes up with 
seller and buyer. For example, the seller and the buyer are the same, or seller is 
mistaken for buyer and buyer is mistaken for seller (Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller, 
2002). I delete all the questionable observations. I also delete those observations 
whose identifiers (PERMNO and GVKEY) could not be located in CRSP and 
Compustat databases. Because conservatism would work on firms through 
identifying projects that are going through losses, if firms sell assets just to raise cash 
and pay debt, it is not exactly the case that they are selling assets of bad quality. In 
order to enhance the chances of finding the most relevant deals conservatism could 
have real effect on, for now I only keep observations whose z-score is above the 
sample median, just to make sure that most firms are not selling assets simply for 
money. Another reason for doing so is that this study requires hand-collecting data. It 
is fairly time-consuming to go through thousands of observations deal by deal. Using 
Shunway's measure to determine financially healthy firms yields basically the same 
sample as z_score does. 
The next important step is to identify the nature of divestiture deals. I search Factiva 
for news reports about the deals in the 9-day window ([-4，+4]) around asset sales 
announcement date (variable DA in SDC). I collect the comments by managers of 
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selling firms, financial analysts and the reporters to identify the nature of the deals. 
First, I want to find out whether a deal is a voluntary or involuntary divestiture, so I 
flag the deals in compliance with antitrust regulations. Also, I need to make sure only 
asset sales of the typical sense would be included, which means that firms indeed 
completely divest assets in exchange for money or buyer's stocks or promissory 
notes. Therefore, I mark deals if selling firms divest less than majority ownership, or 
selling firm uses part ofits assets to formajoint-venture with buyer, or selling firms 
sell assets in exchange for buyer's services or partnership in other dimensions. Only 
firms selling operating assets will be included, so if the assets are already obsolete 
before asset sales, the deal is marked; and some firms will have no other operating 
assets but only cash after they make an asset sale deal, I mark those deals as well. I 
flag firms who are under the protection of Chapter 11 or being processed by 
bankruptcy court or already bankrupt. I also mark asset sales involving real estates, 
like office building, or those deals involving sale-leaseback, where assets are 
unlikely to be sold for their inefficiency. 
The most primary step for this research is to find the most relevant deals where 
accounting conservatism could have effect on. If the projects or assets are not even 
divested for their bad performance (accounting earnings), as a property of earnings, 
accounting conservatism should be irrelevant. Therefore, in order to differentiate 
whether a project deal is divested because of its performance, I hand-collect the 
divestiture reasons through searching divestiture announcements using Factiva. 
• 
The typical news report about asset sale usually uses a routine format that covers 
some ofthe following items: seller's basic information (industry, geographic location, 
sales and profitability, etc); buyer's basic information; comments from seller's 
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management; comments from buyer's management; terms of the deal; sales and 
profitability of the divested assets; when the deal is expected to be closed; 
background of the deals; comments by analysts; the expected effect of this deal on 
buyer and seller's earnings; use of proceeds by seller; change or layoff of 
management and employees in the divested divisions/subsidiaries. Certainly, not 
every item will be covered in a single report. Managers of selling firms disclose 
different extent of information when they announce asset sales; some managers 
really elaborate on the reason of divesting assets, use of proceeds and financial 
condition of the divested assets while others specifically decline to comment on any 
of those issues. Most popular reason that managers claim is “to concentrate on core 
business". For example, in the announcement of selling insurance operations, 
manager of the steel company, Armco, claimed that "Selling our ongoing insurance 
operations is an important strategic step for Armco. This will further enable us to 
fully concentrate our resources on becoming the premier domestic specialty steel 
producer". As Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) suggest, even if the divestitures are 
indeed performance-driven, managers sometime still claim that they are selling to 
"refocus", just as in the CEO turnover announcement, many firms avoided saying 
that CEO leaves because they are getting fired. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the 
reporter or financial analyst's comments on the true reason for asset sales. For 
example, in this announcement, Marisa Christina said "it plans to focus on its core 
businesses and explore new opportunities", but the title of the news is actually 
"Ailing clothes unit sold", suggesting that reporter views this deal as 
performance-related. Some firms cite "paying debt", "funding acquisition and 
expansions", "strengthen balance sheet" or simply "raising cash" as reasons for asset 
sales, all of which are related to liquidity issue. In some cases, the firms shift the 
focus and sell a substantial proportion of core business. Some asset sales are 
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anti-takeover moves to fend offhostile raider. Some firms do not explain the reason 
for divestiture, but the news reports reveal the profitability ofthe divested assets, so I 
keep those deals as well. Some divested assets are really experiencing losses before 
being sold, but others are actually doing pretty well, suggesting that those deals are 
obviously not performance-related. 
After collecting the reasons, the next step is to classify the performance-related and 
non-performance-related divestitures. If managers themselves claim that they are 
divesting the underperforming projects, obviously those deals are 
performance-related. If managers use other reasons like "selling to pay down debt" 
but meanwhile there is other evidence showing that the divested projects are indeed 
losing money, those divestitures should also be classified as performance-related. 
According to Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), managers will use "refocus" as 
divestiture reason even when assets are sold for their bad performance. Considering 
the fact that in overwhelmingly large proportion of deals managers use "refocus" as 
reasons, it is highly possible that at least some of the "refocus" deals are 
performance-related. Also, some managers will distinctively point out that they are 
not divesting the bad assets, and as a matter of fact, the divested assets are actually 
highly profitable. In the main tests, I will classify the "refocus" deals as 
performance-related if managers do not comment on the profitability ofthe divested 
assets and there is no other evidence supporting that the divested assets are profitable. 
However, in the sensitivity test, I also try only classifying those deals where the 
divested assets are absolutely underperforming as performance-related. 
» 
Another key issue for this study is the disclosure of use of proceeds that I argue 
could reflect the efficiency of divestitures. Lang et al. (1995) and Bates (2005) only 
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have deals where firms do disclose use of proceeds, and they search for the use of 
proceeds for a much longer window than I do, and they both assume that investors 
have rational expectations about the use of proceeds at the time of asset sales 
announcement and possibly overstate the importance of proceeds. For my sample 
with thousands of deals, it is practically impossible to search for long window for 
each deal, and I therefore do not assume that investors could expect the use of 
proceeds; as long as firms do not explain the use of proceeds at the time of the asset 
sales announcement, I assume that firms do not have specific use for the proceeds, 
the use of proceeds will be coded as 'N/A'. The caveat here is that some firms might 
disclose the use of proceeds several days later than the divestiture announcement, but 
I misclassify those firms as non-disclosers. On the other hand, as Bates (2005) 
argues，searching for news over longer window than the market reaction window 
(3-day) creates a problem too because investors might not be able to expect actual 
disclosure. Consistent with prior literature, the most frequently cited use of proceeds 
is to pay down debt. Some firms plan on using proceeds for expansions of core 
businesses，and some even directly claim that they will use proceeds to make 
acquisitions. Fewer firms will use proceeds for equity payout, like repurchases and 
special dividends. Following Bate (2005), if more than one use of proceeds is 




This study will adopt the Basu (1997) model to investigate how accounting 
conservatism affects real economic consequences ofdivestitures. The Basu model, or 
the so called timely recognition of losses model (hereafter TLR model), is widely 
used to study the association between accounting conservatism and a variety of 
issues ofinterest in many studies (Francis and Martin, 2010; Garcia Lara et al, 2010; 
Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Ahmed and Duellman, 2009; LaFond and Watts, 2008; 
LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008). 
I follow Francis and Martin (2010)'s measures to assess the success of divestitures, 
namely, the investors' ex-ante expectation of divestiture efFiciency-the market 
reaction towards the divestiture announcement, and the ex-post outcome of 
divestiture-the real performance change after divestiture event. I do not use cash flow 
change as Francis and Martin (2010) do; because firms sell assets in exchange for 
money，so cash flow will automatically go up even when operating efficiency stays 
the same. Using the short window market reaction to news could isolate investors' 
conception about how favorable the deals are, but it does not show the real economic 
effects; using the performance change measure shows the after-event economic 
effects，but the downside is that in long term it is not exactly sure there are no other 
significant corporate events playing a role in performance change. Therefore, the two 
sets ofmeasures, short window market reaction and post-event performance change, 
could complement each other in assessing the success ofdivestitures. 
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Using only one year before the asset sale deal to measure conservatism might be 
problematic, since even timely (early) termination of projects is a decision based on 
divested assets' performance of previous several years. Also, as Roychowdhury and 丨 
Watts (2006) show, TLR model captures accounting conservatism more efficiently 
when earnings and returns are cumulated over multiple periods, because the 
I 
beginning-of-period composition of equity value affects the measure less over longer 
periods. The downside with this aggregated versiqn of TLR, however, is that the 
I 
control variables (leverage, market-to-book ratio, size etc) being used are at the 
beginning of the aggregation period; as the aggregation period grows longer, the 
contracting environment of the firms will change more dramatically, and the control 
variables might not be able to effectively control the characteristics of the firms. 
I 
Since there is no common standard as to the length of aggregation period, I will 
present the results aggregated over 3 to 5 years before the fiscal year when the firm 
sells assets, following the practice of aggregated TLR models in previous papers. 
To test the first hypotheses, I use the aggregated version of Basu (1997) model with 
firm characteristics as control: 
E^-u-j 丨 P.-j-^ = � + AA-i,-y + M-u-j + PA-u-j * R.-u-j + ACar, + /3,Car, * A-,,-； 
+ 0fiar, * ( 1 ’ , 力 . + p,Car^ * A-u-y * ^t-u-j + A"%-y-i 
+ (^9Lev,_j_, * A-i,,-； + |3,oLev,_j_, * R,_,,_j + PuLev,_j_, * A-,,-； * ^,-,,_, 
+ (3,,Size^_j_, + P,,Size,_j_, * D,_,,_, + P,,Size,_j_, * R,_,^,_j 
+ P,sSize,_j_, * A-i,-y * R,-u-J + ^iem-j-, + A7^^,-;-i * A-i,-y 
+ (3具十\ * R,.,,_j + P,,MB,_j_, * A-i,-> * R,-u-j + "2。丄衍,十1 I 




E,_,,_j!P,_j_, =a + AA-M-y +/^2^-i,-y +AA-M-y*^-i,-y +P,APerform^ 
+ p,APerform^ *D^_, ,_. +p,APerform, *i?,_,,_. +P,APerform, *A-i,-, *^-,,_, 
+ A^^V,-;-l +线丄作,个丨 *A-M-y +/^ 0丄〜力-丨 *^-,,_; 
+ A i l e v , + i * iVu-y*^-U_, +钱2怨％—1 +钱3胞、乂—1 *A-i,_, 
+ A 4 ^ e , + 1 * A _ 1 , _ , +钱5览、,-1 * A _ , , _ / i ^ _ u - y +曰具十\ 
+ A 7 ^ , - ; - l * A - , , - ; +钱8爐,一"*(1’,力 + A 9 ^ , - " 1 * A - 1 , , - / ( 1 , , _ , 
+/?20丄衍,—,—1 +Ai^^- ;_ , *A-1’,-, +fW-j-�*代-1" 
+ "23"",十1*々务,代—1,_,+£ 
t is the asset divestiture fiscal year, and t-1 is the fiscal year before that, j is equal to 3, 
4 or 5 in different specifications. 
E,-i,t-j 丨 Pf-j-i: selling firm's accumulated income before extraordinary items (data 
item ‘IB，）over the aggregation period (3 or 4 or 5 years) scaled by the market value 
of equity (item PRCC_F*item CSHO) at the beginning of the aggregation period, i.e. 
at the beginning o f 3 or 4 or 5 years before the divestiture fiscal year. 
R,-� t - j : selling firm's buy-and-hold stock retum over fiscal year t-j to t-1, j is equal 
to 3 or 4 or 5, and t is the fiscal year of divestiture. 
A-i,/-y: dummy variable that is equal to one if i?,—i，,_) is less than zero. 
Car^ : selling firm's market-adjusted cumulative abnormal retum over [ - l , + l' 
window with date zero being the asset sales announcement date. 
Lev,_j_^: selling firm's book value of debt (item DLC+item DLTT) to book value of 
total assets measured at the beginning of the aggregation period. 
Size,_j_i: selling firm's logarithm of total asset (item AT) at the beginning of the 
aggregation period. 
膽丨一“.selling firm's market value of equity (item PRCC_F*item CSHO) to book 
value ofequity (item CEQ) measured at the beginning ofthe aggregation period. 
Liti,_j_i ： dummy variable equal to one if the calendar year at the beginning of the 
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aggregation period is a high litigation risk year; low litigation years are 1980-1981， 
1986-1987，and 1992-2001, and the rest of the years are classified as high litigation 
risk years; for example, the firm divests some assets in the year of 2000, and the firm 
has December 31 as fiscal year end; in the regression aggregated over 3 years, the 
beginning of the period is January 1，1997, which is a low litigation year and 
"",_y_i is equal to 0. 
APerform^ : selling firm's performance change after the divestiture e v e n t ; � 
^ROA -average ROA (item IB/item AT) over two fiscal years after the divestiture 
minus average ROA over two fiscal years before the d i v e s t i t u r e ; � 
AOFERROA -pre-event performance matched operating ROA change from t+1 (or 
t+2) fiscal year to t-1 fiscal year based on the methodology of Barber and Lyon 
(1996), in order to control for the mean-revering effect of accounting information 
and eliminate the possibility of mechanical relation between accounting conservatism 
and change in earnings. Operating ROA is equal to operating income before 
deprecation (item OIBDP), which is measured as sales minus cost of goods sold, and 
selling, general and administrative expenses, to total assets. As Barber and Lyon 
(1996) argue, this measure is actually more appropriate than ROA to assess operating 
efficiency because corporate events people study usually change capital structure and 
mechanically change future ROA. A lot of firms use proceeds from asset sales to pay 
down debt and significantly decrease future interest payment, and the future ROA 
will automatically increase. In year t-1, firm i is matched to a control group of firms 
(event firms are excluded from control group) who have the same two-digit SIC code 
as firm i and operating ROA is in the range of 90%-110% off i rm i's operating ROA. 
If I find no control firms, I change the two-digit constraint to one-digit constrain. I 





The test variables are Car,*D,_,,_.*R,_^,_j andAPerform, * A_,,_. * R,_,^,_j. I do 
not predict the sign for P^，because it could be positive based on the governance role 
of accounting conservatism and timely termination of bad projects and it could also 
be negative based on the bias in information of accounting conservatism and wrong 
liquidation of possible good projects. However, for non-performance-related 
divestitures, I expect /¾ to be insignificant. Since firms make termination decisions 
based on other considerations, like receiving good price or fending off a hostile 
takeover, conservatism as a property of accounting performance should not be related 
to the market reaction or performance change associated with the divestitures. For 
performance-related divestitures, I expect /3^  to be significant. 
To test the second hypotheses, I use the following TLR models: 
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Noproceeds: Some firms voluntarily announce what they plan to do with the 
proceeds they receive from asset sales, but other firms do not disclose such 
information. Voluntary disclosure of use of proceeds could help reduce the ‘ 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders and justify the 
divestiture decisions. Leone et al (2007) code the specificity of use of proceeds in ‘ 
firms, IPO prospectus, and find that more specific disclosure of use of proceeds is 
related to less serious IPO underpricing. By the same token, market should react 
more to deals whose proceeds they know are put into appropriate use. Also, if 
managers do not disclose the use of proceeds because they really do not have any 
plan，the following performance change is also going to be less favorable compared 
to those managers who either use proceeds to reduce future interest costs or invest 
proceeds in better projects. For firms who do disclose the use of proceeds, I do not 
predict the direction of the relation between market reaction or performance chance, ‘ 
i.e. I do not predict the sign of 线 of the above models, but I predict that ^,5 of the 
two models above should be negative. ‘ 
Other variables are defined before in the previous models. I also control for two-digit 
SIC industry fixed effects in the TLR models. Since the litigation variable is coded ‘ 
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based on year, I do not control for year fixed effects, although adding back year 
dummies yields very similar results. 





SECTION 6.1 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
I search the divestiture announcements for 2500 deals, and I delete duplicate and 
problematic deals. I cannot find news reports for some deals in Factiva, and some 
firms announce the divestiture in a very brief manner and no useful information 
could be found. I only keep those deals where I can find the reason for divestiture，or 
I can find the pre-divestiture performance of divested assets even if firms disclose no 
reason for asset sales. Some firms disclose the rough profitability of divested assets 
in the announcement when they do not directly comment on the reason for sales, and 
analysts sometimes also comment on the profitability of divested assets. Finally, I 
locate 1487 divestiture deals, although in different models the number of 
observations will be smaller depending on the data availability of other variables. 
Among the 1487 deals, I classify deals to be performance-related as long as 
pre-divestiture performance of divested assets appears to be bad or unfavorable 
compared to the rest of the assets no matter what the reasons the divesting firms give. 
For example, firms disclose that they are selling assets to pay back debt, but ifthere 
is evidence showing that the divested assets are underperforming, I will classify this 
deal as performance- related. I also classify deals where firms claim to ‘refocus，but 
do not give description about the profitability of divested assets as 
performance-related. As Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) observe, managers site 
'refocus' as a reason even if they are indeed divesting underperforming assets. 
However, there are deals where managers distinctively point out that the divested 
assets are performing well but for some reasons they just need to sell them. For 
example, in 1988 when CBS sells one of its recording units to Sony, one new report 
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by Reuter News Agency goes like this "The unit, whose top recording artists 
includes Michael Jackson and Bruce Springsteen, has recently been a star performer 
at CBS, helping to offset a slump in the core broadcasting business. But industry 
analysts said CBS chief executive Laurence Tisch, who has conducted a major 
reorganization of the company since taking over a year ago, favors selling the unit 
when it is at thepeak ofprofitability (Wyman lost his job last Sept. 10 after failing 
to pull CBS up from bad business decisions that had made it a takeover target.) After 
gaining the support of the beleaguered CBS board, Tisch- head of conglomerate 
Loews Corp-became CBS's president and CEO, and moved fast: He applied a sharp 
knife to CBS' payroll and expenses, and sold the educational and professional 
publishing unit ($500M); the music publishing unit ($125M); and the magazine arm 
($650M). Tisch reportedly favors selling the records division because of the 
volatility of the record business." In this case, I would classify this deal as 
non-performance-related. Admittedly, this prudent coding might create a noisy 
performance-related sample by wrongly including non-performance-related deals, 
which will work against my results for both performance-related and 
non-performance-related samples. In the end, I get 975 performance-related 
divestiture deals and 512 non-performance-related deals. In the non-performance-
related sample, there are 179 deals coded as 'untypical divestitures' mentioned 
before in the sample description. 
Table 1 shows the sample distribution of full sample, performance-related sample 
and non-performance-related sample by announcement year; except for very early 
years, other deals are distributed with a slightly upward trend across sample period. 
The last column shows the proportion of non-performance-related sample, and over 
the entire sample period, there is almost 35% deals classified as 
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non-performance-related, indicating that ignoring the nature of divestiture deals 
might be really problematic. 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for three samples. The mean of 3-day Car for 
all deals is 2.4%, which is somehow larger than what the previous literature 
documents. Bates (2005) documents a 1.2% 3-day Car for his full sample, and Lang 
et al (1995) has a 1.4% Car over [-1，0] 2-day window. The difference could be due 
to the sample composition; my sample is significantly larger than the previous asset 
sales studies ^>apers in 1990s usually have a sample size below 200) and my sample 
period is so much longer. Interestingly, the non-performance-related sample's Car, 
2.9% is even larger than performance-related sample's 2.1%, although the difference 
is not significant. Total assets, leverage, Market-to-Book, Tobin's q and high 
litigation risk dummy are quite comparable to buyers in the sample of Francis and 
Martin (2010), but the dummy D for negative return is as high as 42%, consistent 
with previous findings that selling firms usually experience negative performance 
before divestitures. The three performance measures AROA, A OPERROAt+i and 
A OPERROAt+2 are all slightly negative, showing that performance keeps 
deteriorating even after divestitures. The average deal size is about 190 million 
dollars, smaller than 449 to 1132 millions documented by Slovin et al (2005), 
probably because in Slovin et al's sample, both seller and buyer are publicly traded 
firms, and larger firms are more likely to make larger deals, while in my sample, only 
sellers are required to be publicly traded. In more than 18% deals, firms 
simultaneously drop at least one business segment in the same effective fiscal year of 
divestiture, consistent with the refocusing effect (John and Ofek, 1995). Based on the 
information in the announcement, 23% of the deals belong to a restructuring program, 
and 87% deals are either stand-alone deals or the first deals in a restructuring 
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program. However, those two variables are extremely noisy, considering the fact that 
the news reports might not always mention whether a deal belongs to a program even 
if it does. More than 10% of deals have insiders as buyers. In almost 7% deals, 
buyers pay their own stocks in the mixture of consideration to sellers. In slightly 
more than halfthe sample deals, selling firms do not disclose how they are going to 
use the proceeds from asset sales, reflecting the voluntary nature ofthis disclosure. 
From the Panel B ofTable 2, it is obvious that selling firms ofperformance-related 
deals and non-performance-related deals have quite different characteristics. Based 
on the aggregated scaled earnings, the buy-and-hold returns and the dummy for 
negative returns, clearly performance-related sample firms perform much better, 
which is not at all surprising, since some of the non-performance-related sample 
firms are already under the pressure of delisting or under the chapter 11 protection. 
Non-performance-related sample firms also have larger leverage, lower 
market-to-book ratio and lower Tobin's q. More interestingly, 
non-performance-related sample firms are less likely to have insiders as buyer, but 
more likely to disclose the use of proceeds. One obvious reason is that firms need to 
cash in quickly so that they can pay back debt. For example, some firms fend off 
hostile take-over bid by taking on huge amount ofdebt; after the raider is frighten ofF, 
firms need to come up with quick cash to pay for the costly anti-takeover defenses, 
including the debt and interest expenses. Another reason is that managers really use 
the asset sales as a way of financing well-planned projects, so they sell the most 
liquid (easy to sell, but not necessarily the worst-performing) assets to provide 
« 
capital and immediately use money to invest internally or make acquisitions. In other 
words, non-performance-related sample firms need cash up and front, and sell assets 
to get the cash; while performance-related sample need to sell assets first and 
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consequently get the cash. 
The correlation table is shown in table 3，above the diagonal line being the Pearson 
correlation and below the diagonal line the Spearman correlation. In table 4,1 show 
the market reaction and post-divestiture performance change based on the breakdown 
of reasons cited by managers in the divestiture announcements. The frequencies of 
different reasons are also shown. In panel A, it is shown that, consistent with Kaplan 
and Weisbach (1992)，'refocus' is the most frequently cited reason by managers, 
constituting almost half of the full sample. The next frequently cited reason is bad 
performance of divested assets, the most relevant ones in the accounting 
conservatism setting. Many firms explicitly say that they are selling because they 
need to pay debt, other firms use more subtle expressions like "raise cash to increase 
liquidity" or "strengthen balance sheet", which might or might not be the same as 
selling to pay down debt. Firms also claim to sell assets to fund expansions of certain 
projects or acquisitions occasionally. In rare cases, firms sell core business just so 
that they can diversify in other business areas, or the firms want to tum themselves 
around by selling assets, increasing both cash position and earnings, or they sell 
simply because buyer pays an attractive price, or the divested assets have been a drag 
on the firm's valuation because investors find it hard to understand the business. 
Besides the CBS case mentioned above (reason coded as 'volatility'), ‘good price’ 
and 'tumaround' get the most favorable market reaction, followed by 'expansions', 
'debt' and 'untypical divestitures' and 'undervalue'. Although the 'refocus' and 
'performance' deals get decent market reaction, the clear message from this table is 
that when it comes to asset sales, investors are happy about the sale decision not 
simply because the divested assets are underperforming and firms would be 
better-offgetting rid of the money-losing projects. As for the performance, firms that 
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make the 'refocus' and 'performance' deals continue to perform worse in two years 
following the divestitures, especially for the 'performance' deals, and it is probably 
because selling firms are experiencing difficulty in general and asset sale itselfis not 
enough to turn the firms around immediately. However, the worst performance 
change comes from the ‘shift focus，deals, proving that it is very hard for firms to 
successfully diversify due to the limited expertise. 
There are 179 untypical divestitures, the breakdown ofwhich is shown in the panel D. 
Besides the involuntary asset sales, like antitrust regulation by Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice of United States, or bankrupt firms' 
reorganization plans, another major type of untypical divestitures are actually 
strategic alliance between two firms, i.e. two firms sign other contracts 
simultaneously with the asset sale deals, or two firms form a joint venture. Other 
trivial deals involve donation (no money received), settlement with government or 
truce agreement between two firms who are fighting to take over a third firm etc. 
Table 5 shows the mean 3-day selling firm announcement Car and post-divestiture 
performance change based on the break-down of use ofproceeds. From the panel A, 
the fiill sample, it is obvious that in most cases firms do not comment on how they 
plan to use the proceeds from asset sales. The most frequent use of proceeds (188 
deals), consistent with prior literature, is to pay down debt. Following paying down 
debt，the next frequent use is to expand firms' current business, and in some cases, 
firms even explicitly intend to use the proceeds to ftmd acquisitions. The 
» 
'expansions' in table 5 generally means internal expansion where firms argue they 
will reinvest the proceeds in their core business; together with 'acquisitions', these 
two kinds of use constitute 121 deals. There are 59 deals where firms directly 
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distribute the proceeds either through repurchase (43 deals) or through special 
dividend (16 deals). The most favorable market reaction comes from the deals whose 
proceeds is used to pay special dividends, and the most prominent performance 
improvement (or least performance deterioration) comes from the deals whose 
proceeds is used to make acquisitions or restructure the firms. Paying down debt also 
has quite positive effect on market reaction and performance change. In panel C，the 
performance-related sample, any disclosure of use of proceeds will increase the 
market reaction to divestiture announcement, for deals without disclosure of 
proceeds have the smallest 3-day Car. Those deals also have comparatively worse 
post-divestiture performance change, though not the worst. 
SECTION 6.2 TIMELY LOSS RECOGNITION AND SELLING FIRM 
MARKET REACTION TO DIVESTITURE ANNOUNCEMENT 
Table 6 reports the multivariate results of the timely loss recognition models and 
selling firm 3-day Car to divestiture announcement. Panel A is the result of this test 
for the non-performance-related divestitures sample. If assets are disposed for other 
reasons rather than performance of divested assets, accounting conservatism should 
not have any effect, and panel A is just making this simple point. The coefficients on 
Car*D*R are all positive but insignificant in Panel A, consistent with the hypothesis. 
In panel B，the coefficients on Car*D*R are all negative, and significant at 5% level 
for regression aggregated over 4 years and significant at 10% level for regression 
aggregated over 5 years. Since the coefficients are all negative, the result supports 
the biased information and wrong liquidation of good projects argument, not the 
timely termination of bad projects argument. Because the three regressions are all 
aggregated over more than 1 year, the adjusted R^ is generally higher than the 1-year 
TLR models in Francis and Martin (2010), but the adjusted R^ between 40% and 
43% is comparable to 49% adjusted R^ over 3 years in LaFond and Watts (2008). 
40 
The main D*R coefficient are all significantly positive, supporting the original Basu 
model. The interaction between leverage, size, market-to-book ratio and litigation 
risk and D*R generally have the right signs, but none ofthem are significant. Overall, 
the results above support the hypothesis 1. 
SECTION 6.3 TIMELY LOSS RECOGNITION AND SELLING FIRM 
POST-DIVESTITURE PERFORMANCE CHANGE 
Table 7 shows the results of TLR models and the selling firm post-divestiture 
performance changes. Panel A and panel B usesAROA as performance measure, 
panel C and panel D use AOPERROAt+i as performance measure, and panel E and 
panel F useAOPERROAt+2 as performance measure, with panel A, panel C and 
panel E being the results of non-performance-related divestitures, and panel B, panel 
D and panel F the results of performance-related divestitures. Consistent with the 
results in table 6, the coefficients on APerform*D*R are all insignificant and 
generally positive in panel A, panel C and panel D，supporting the argument that 
conservatism will not affect the post-divestiture performance change in the 
non-performance-related divestitures. For performance-related divestitures, in panel 
B，the coefficient on AROA*D*R is significantly negative in the regression over 
4-year, and marginally significantly negative in the regressions over 3 and 5 years, 
which is also supportive ofthe wrong liquidation of good projects argument. None of 
the coefficients on 
AOPERROAt+i*D*R in panel D are significant, although all of them are negative. 
In panel F，the coefficient onAOPERROAt+2*D*R is significantly negative in the 
regression over 3-year. The coefficients on basic D*R are almost always significantly 
« 
positive in panel B，panel D and panel F，but the coefficients on the interaction 
between D*R and size, leverage, market-to-book and litigation risk are in the right 
direction but insignificant. 
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SECTION 6.4 TIMELY LOSS RECOGNITION AND NON-DISCLOSURE OF 
USE OF PROCEEDS 
Table 8 reports the results of timely loss recognition and 3-day Car/post-divestiture 
performance change with the interaction of disclosure of use of proceeds. In this 
table, only performance-related divestitures are used, and panel A，panel B, panel C， 
panel D represent the results of 3-day Car, A ROA, A OPERROAt+i，A 
OPERROAt+2 respectively. In panel A, the mean effect is still significantly negative 
in the TLR model over 4 years, but the interactions with non-disclosure of use pf 
proceeds are not significant, although two out of three interactions are of the right 
negative sign. In panel B，in the TLR model over 5 years, the coefficient onA 
ROA*D*R is significantly positive, indicating that for selling firms who do disclose 
the use of proceeds, more conservative firms are actually experiencing more 
favorable performance outcome; however, the coefficient on A 
ROA*Noproceeds*D*R is significantly negative, and the absolute value of the 
coefficient is even larger than that of AROA*D*R, suggesting that non-disclosure 
of use of proceeds completely offsets the benefits of conservative accounting on 
divestiture decisions. TLR models over 3 and 4 years do not generate significant 
results, but both coefficients on AROA*D*R and AROA*Noproceeds*D*R are of 
the right direction. In panel C, in TLR model over 3 years, the coefficient on A 
OPERROAt+i*D*R is marginally significantly positive，and the coefficient on A 
OPERROAt+i *Noproceeds*D*R is significantly negative. In panel D，in TLR 
models over 3 and 4 years, the coefficients on A OPERROAt+2*D*R are 
significantly positive, and the coefficients onAOPERROAt+2*Noproceeds*D*R are 
significantly negative, and the size of the latter coefficients overpowers the former 
ones. Overall, the TLR models with interaction between post-divestiture performance 




I use 5-day Car instead of 3-day Car, and I also try the size-adjusted Car rather than 
the market-adjusted Car; the results are qualitatively the same. 
hi the post-divestiture performance change tests，besides the raw AROA, I also try 
the ROA adjusted by the median of two-digit industry benchmark, and the results are 
almost the same. 
Because in most cases asset sales will have implications on earnings change (could 
be positive or negative effect, depending on how favorable a price the selling firms 
can fetch for their divested assets), some of the divestiture announcements are 
actually made in conference calls where firms announce quarterly/annual earnings or 
make earnings guidance for the following quarters. This serious confounding event 
makes it hard to argue that the market reaction is meant for the divestiture 
announcement itself. Other confounding events include CEO turnover, dividend 
announcement, ruling of lawsuits, and change in credit rating of selling firms etc. I 
exclude deals with confounding events, and the results are still similar. 
In the main tests, the performance-related samples include some "refocus" deals 
where selling firms do not comment on the profitability of the divested asaets. 
However, it is also possible that those "refocus" deals are indeed not madc because 
o f the underperformance of divested assets. I try the more "pure" sample, including 
only deals where divested assets are actually experiencing bad performance. 
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Obviously, the sample is much smaller, and number of observations in different 
regressions is around 300，but the results do appear to be stronger. However, 
considering the fact that I start from 2500 deals, only 300 deals being classified as 
performance-related seems a huge understatement. 
Dhaliwal et al (2008) show that accounting conservatism is positively related with 
the level of product market competition, indicating that product market competition, 
like size, leverage and litigation risk, is an important control variable that should, be 
included in the timely loss recognition model. Following Dhaliwal et al (2008)，I use 
Herfmdahl index multiplied by minus one to measure product market competition 
intensity. Herfmdahl index is the sum of squared firm market share in each industry, 
and market share is measured using sales, book value of equity or total assets. All the 
results are qualitatively the same, and occasionally some results are even improved. 
Whenever the interaction of the product market competition variable, D and R is 
significant, it is significantly positive, consistent with Dhaliwal et al (2008). 
Apart from the actual performance, I also try the analyst's forecast change after 
divestiture announcement for t+1 and t+2 years for selling firms. However, I did not 
find consistent results, probably because of the small sample since one-year and 




There is an increasing literature discussing the relationship between accounting 
attributes, especially accounting conservatism and investment efficiency. This paper 
aims to investigate how accounting conservatism will affect firm's divesting existing 
projects, and directly links the relation between firm accounting conservatism level 
and the economic consequences related to divestitures. I find that more conservative 
firms have less favorable divestiture announcement market reaction and post-event 
performance change, but this negative relation is almost entirely driven by deals 
where firms do not disclose the use of proceeds from asset sales. 
Watts (2003) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue that since conservative 
accounting asymmetrically recognizes bad news more timely, managers are 
disciplined to take on more profitable projects ex-ante and dispose bad projects more 
quickly ex-post. However, as for the "ex-post" part, Li (2009) and Gigler et al (2009) 
both indicate that conservatism could actually reduce the investment efficiency when 
firms might wrongly terminate good projects because conservative accounting 
sometimes generate false alarm. Besides these two papers, FASB has been 
questioning the validity of conservatism as an accounting principle for years. It 
argues that conservatism biases accounting information and creates information 
asymmetry. This paper empirically tests the relationship between efficiency of 
divestiture decisions and conservatism by using the Basu (1997) model. Although 
there are other papers trying to investigate how accounting conservatism affects the 
ex-post termination of bad projects, those papers do not directly show the relation 
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between economic consequences related to divestitures and conservatism, and more 
importantly, they cannot show that projects are really divested because of their bad 
performance. After searching for divestiture announcements in Factiva for 2500 
divestiture deals in SDC database, I keep 1487 deals whose background and nature is 
verifiable. I find that around 35% of divestiture deals are actually not decided based 
on the profitability of the divested assets, but other reasons irrelevant to the 
arguments by Watts (2003) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005). I find that conservatism 
is not related with non-performance-related divestitures. Conservatism does 
influence both the market reaction to the asset sales announcement and 
post-divestiture performance change for performance-related divestitures, but the 
relationship is negative, inconsistent with the timely termination of bad projects 
argument but consistent with the false alarm signal and wrong liquidation of good 
projects argument by Li (2009), Gigler et al (2009) and FASB. 
I further document that the negative relation above is mainly driven by firms who do 
not disclose use of proceeds from asset sales, indicating that conservatism is 
especially harmful when firms sell assets but have no better alternatives with the 
freed up capital. Therefore, how conservatism works on divestiture decisions and 
investment efficiency as a whole might be more complicated than originally 
proposed, and this paper shows that conservatism works hand in hand with disclosure, 
and conservatism has more positive (less negative) effect when firms provide more 
information about the divestiture decisions. 
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Appendix A. Accounting Treatment ofDisposal ofAssets and Special Items. 
Disposal of assets are completely different from asset write-down or asset write-off, 
for assets are disposed in exchange for consideration (cash, buyer's stocks, 
promissory notes etc), but assets are written down or written off without receipt of 
consideration, such as write-downs or write-offs of receivables or intangibles. 
The most recent accounting rule on disposal of assets is SFAS 144 issued in 2001. 
SFAS requires that "a component of an entity" should be reported as discontinued 
operations (data66 or DO for new version), one of the special items in Compustat, if 
this component has been disposed of or classified as held for sale. "A component of 
an entity" could be a reportable segment, an operating segment, a reporting unit, a 
subsidiary, or an asset group. Both the loss from operations of discontinued assets 
and loss/gain on disposal of those assets will be reflected on discontinued operations. 
Chen and Zhang (2006) use non-empty discontinued operations items as the first clue 
to identify divestment before searching Lexis-Nexis for news. Sriyastava and Tse 
(2010) use the discontinued operations directly. 
Under US-GAAP, the current version (2010) Compustat manual classifies 16 unusual 
or nonrecurring items as "Special Items" (datal7 or SPI for the new version), 
including discontinued operations. Other special items include natural disaster losses, 
asset write-down, restructuring charges, etc. Therefore, the use of special items in the 
asset divestiture setting is very noisy, for special items include so many items 
unrelated to the termination of projects. However, special items do include other 
items besides discontinued operations that might be related to disposal but not 
reflected in discontinued operations accounts. For example, many asset sale deals 
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belong to a restructuring program, and firms usually spend a lot on the restructuring 
costs (like hiring investment banks to seek a buyer for the divested assets) and take 
restructuring charges, an individual account that belongs to special items. Frankel 
and Roychowdhury (2009) argue that special items not only reflect the losses from 
money-losing projects per se, but also reflect managerial actions to reverse such 
losses (like restructuring charges). 
To sum up, in terms of accounting items, while discontinued operations directly 
speak to the disposal of assets, there are other special items related to the disposal. 
Example 1. (From Form 10-K) 
Verso Technologies, Inc. 
For the fiscal year ended December 31,2002 
During 2000，the Board formally decided to dispose of HSG. In December 2000, the 
Company completed the sale of its domestic lodging business and international 
hospitality business for aggregate proceeds of $10.0 million. The Company sold its 
restaurant solutions business for aggregate proceeds of$8.5 million in January 2001. 
The loss on the sale of HSG totaled $11.5 million. A loss of $11.0 million was 
recorded in the third and fourth quarters of 2000. The loss included a reduction in 
asset values of approximately $6.7 million and a provision for anticipated closing 
costs and operating losses until disposal of approximately $4.8 million. An additional 
$500,000 was recorded in the third quarter of 2001, related to winding up the 
< 
Company's international hospitality operations, the assets of which were sold in the 




Summary operating results of the discontinued operations (in thousands) are as 
follows: 
Decen=er 31： 
2001 2000 I 
Revenue $ 12, 762 $ 96, 944 | 
WMiMWiMimiiiiMWiii wwrwm^wv,朴， | 
Gross profit $ 374 $ 23,429 ‘ 
eMMMtMMBMMCWW MrrfRfMNrMisrM 
Operating loss $(135, 598) $(35, 2 9 1 ) : 
Interest expense — (785) 
Loss on disposal of assets (500) (6,704)丨 
Income tax expense — (170) 
Loss from discontinued operations $(136, 098) $(42, 950) 
wmaMWWBWrtWMt *m;v*f««m-.-^' x.r-i' ^ 
The loss from discontinued operations in the year ended December 30, 2001, 
I 
includes depreciation of $546,000, amortization of intangibles of $22.7 million, 
write-down of goodwill of $95.3 million, amortization of deferred compensation of 
$267,000 and reorganization costs of $9.2 million. The operating loss in 2000 
includes depreciation of $1.8 million, amortization of intangibles of $11.5 million, 
.. 1 
amortization of deferred compensation of $126,000, reorganization costs of 
] 




The reorganization costs consist of the following (in thousands): 
2001 2000 
Severance costs $1^217 $731 
Facilities closings 6,162 258 
Inventory write-down 1^  005 — ‘ 
HessageClick ASP exiting costs 824 — 
$9, 208 $989 
1 
WII'BM'BII t a * s > i 





For the fiscal year ended December 31，2007 
In 2007 the Company completed the sale of its outpatient physical therapy business, 
Physiotherapy Associates, to Water Street Healthcare Partners, for $150 million in 
cash less certain indebtedness. Physiotherapy Associates' operating results are 
reported as discontinued operations for all periods presented (2005，2006, 2007). The 
sale of Physiotherapy Associates resulted in a gain on sale of discontinued operations 
of $25.7 million (net of income taxes), or $.06 per diluted share in 2007. Net 
earnings from discontinued operations for the year ended December 31, 2007 were 
$5.0 million, or $.01 per diluted share, compared to net earnings from discontinued 
operations of $6.3 million, or $.02 per diluted share, for the year ended December 31, 
2006. 
Reclassifications: Certain prior year amounts have been reclassified to conform 
with the presentation used in 2007. The Company has reclassified its Consolidated 
Financial Statements to reflect discontinued operations. 
4 
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Appendix B. Examples of Divestiture Announcements. 
Example 1: A Non-performance-related Deal (From Business Wire) 
The Cable Division has been a profitable segment of our business. However it was 
most important, at this time, to focus all of Evans' management and financial 
resources in the rapidly growing environmental consulting and management area 
where it has 10 years of experience. The payment received by Evans was a 
combination of cash, secured notes, assumption of liabilities and forgiveness of debt. 
Example 2: A Performance-related Deal (From Dow Jones News Service) 
In March 1992, Ecolab announced it was seeking strategic alternatives for its 
ChemLawn subsidiary including the sale of the company or the possible spin-off. 
ChemLawn, which operates in the Buffalo area, has been on the block since early 
this year after failing to meet the earnings expectations of its parent, Ecolab Inc., 
which outbid Waste Managemejitfor it back in 1987. In recent years, ChemLawn has 
lost more than one-third of its customers andfailed to turn a profit in some years. 
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Table 1 
Sample Distribution by AnnouncementYear 
Full Performance Non-Performance 
Percentage of 
Year Number of Percentage Numberof Percentage Number of Percentage 
Non-Performance 
Divestitures of Sample Divestitures ofSample Divestitures of Sample 
1981 1 0.07 0 0 1 0.2 100.00 
1982 7 0.47 3 0.31 4 0.78 57.14 
1983 18 1.21 11 1.13 7 1.37 38.89 
1984 55 3.7 37 3.79 18 3.52 32.73 
1985 42 2.82 29 2.97 13 2.54 30.95 
1986 52 3.5 32 3.28 20 3.91 38.46 
1987 46 3.09 29 2.97 17 3.32 36.96 
1988 34 2.29 12 1.23 22 4.3 64.71 
1989 51 3.43 36 3.69 15 2.93 29.41 
1990 36 2.42 22 2.26 14 2.73 38.89 
1991 38 2.56 28 2.87 10 1.95 26.32 
1992 45 3.03 26 2.67 19 3.71 42.22 
1993 30 2.02 22 2.26 8 1.56 26.67 
1994 48 3.23 28 2.87 20 3.91 41.67 
1995 51 3.43 32 3.28 19 3.71 37.25 
1996 65 4.37 36 3.69 29 5.66 44.62 
1997 70 4.71 46 4.72 24 4.69 34.29 
1998 58 3.9 44 4.51 14 2.73 24.14 
1999 78 5.25 47 4.82 31 6.05 39.74 
2000 96 6.46 62 6.36 34 6.64 35.42 
2001 96 6.46 68 6.97 28 5.47 29.17 
2002 79 5.31 50 5.13 29 5.66 36.71 
2003 78 5.25 49 5.03 29 5.66 37.18 
2004 61 4.1 48 4.92 13 2.54 21.31 
2005 71 4.77 45 4.62 26 5.08 36.62 
2006 60 4.03 46 4.72 14 2.73 23.33 
2007 73 4.91 56 5.74 17 3.32 23.29 
2008 48 3.23 31 3.18 17 3.32 35.42 
Total 1487 100 975 100 512 100 • 34.43 
Table 1 reports the sample distribution by divestiture announcement year. The sample consists of 1487 divestitures 
by US firms documented in the SDC database over 1981-2008. Percentage of sample means the number of 
divestitures in a specific year to the total number of divestitures over the sample period. Percentage of 




Summary Statistics ‘ 
Panel A: Full Samole 
Variable N Mean Std Q^ Median Q3 一 
Car (3-Day) 1443 0.024 0.086 -0.017 0.009 0.047 » 
E/P (3-Year TLR) 1487 0.035 0.493 -0.069 0.131 0.258 
E/P (4-Year TLR) 1434 0.121 0.560 -0.070 0.205 0.388 
E/P (5-YearTLR) 1355 0.199 0.778 -0.057 0.282 0.545 ^ 
R(3-YearTLR) 1487 0.318 1.063 -0.370 0.140 0.646 
R(4-YearTLR) 1487 0.473 1.261 -0.371 0.205 0.901 
R(5-YearTLR) 1487 0.631 1.441 -0.392 0.301 1.133 
D (3-Year TLR) 1487 0.420 0.494 0.000 0.000 1.000 1 
D (4-Year TLR) 1487 0.401 .0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 
D (5-Year TLR) 1487 0.392 0.488 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Total assets (3-YearTLR;million$) 1487 3479.123 6736.672 133.971 734.116 . 3443.226 ^ 
Total assets (4-YearTLR;miIlion$) 1481 3228.437 6499.913 117.725 692.982 3227.949 
Total assets (5-YearTLR;million$) 1442 3098.744 6469.275 106.634 646.570 3031.767 
Leverage (3-YearTLR) 1487 0.244 0.158 0.137 0.228 0.337 
Leverage (4-YearTLR) 1480 0.247 0.163 0.140 0.236 0.331 I 
Leverage (5-YearTLR) 1442 0.251 0.173 0.134 0.237 0.340 
MB(3-YearTLR) 1487 2.511 2.801 1.062 1.749 2.887 
MB(4-YearTLR) 1434 2.524 2.951 1.065 1.704 2.905 
MB(5-YearTLR) 1355 2.269 2.284 1.051 1.667 2.754 ^ 
Liti (3-YearTLR) 1487 0.400 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Liti (4-YearTLR) 1487 0.380 0.486 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Liti (5-YearTLR) 1487 0.382 0.486 0.000 0.000 1.000 ^ 
AROA 1301 -0.020 0.162 -0.045 -0.002 0.038 
AOPERROA(t+1 tot-1) 988 -0.021 0.132 -0.049 -0.007 0.030 
AOPERROA (t+2 to t-1) 854 -0.010 0.113 -0.048 -0.006 0.034 
Deal Value (million$) 1396 189.359 559.051 11.450 44.150 145.000 】 
TobinQ 1385 1.509 0.835 0.998 1.246 1.698 
Drop 1487 0.184 0.387 0.000 0.000 0.000 
First 1487 0.873 0.334 1.000 1.000 1.000 ^ 
Insiders 1487 0.104 0.306 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pay_equity 1487 0.066 0.248 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Noproceeds 1487 0.542 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 , 






Panel B: Performance-Driven Non-Performance-Driven 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Car (3-Day) 945 0.021 0.008 498 0.029 0.011 
E/P (3-YearTLR) 975 0.077*** 0.137*** 512 -0.046 0.113 
E/P (4-YearTLR) 941 0.159*** 0.212** 493 0.048 0.173 
E/P (5-YearTLR) 884 0.255*** 0.290** 471 0.095 0.265 
R (3-Year TLR) 975 0.332 0.146* 512 0.290 0.111 
R(4-YearTLR) 975 0.492 0.237** 512 0.437 0.143 
R{5-YearTLR) 975 0.645 0.373*** 512 0.605 0.187 
D(3-YearTLR) 975 0.407 0.000 512 0.443 0.000 
D(4-YearTLR) 975 0.379** 0.000** 512 0.443 0.000 
D(5-YearTLR) 975 0.372** 0.000** 512 0.430 0.000 
Total assets (3-YearTLR;million$) 975 3432.836 712.887 512 3567.266 771.466 
Total assets (4-YearTLR;million$) 971 3208.998 667.716 510 3265.448 716.828 
Total assets (5-YearTLR;million$) 946 3072.929 635.411 496 3147.980 672.961 
Leverage (3-YearTLR) 975 0.231*** 0.217*** 512 0.269 0.258 
Leverage (4-YearTLR) 970 0.231*** 0.220*** 510 0.275 0.261 
Leverage (5-YearTLR) 946 0.236*** 0.218*** 496 0.282 0.263 
MB (3-YearTLR) 975 2.584 1.785 512 2.372 1.682 
MB(4-YearTLR) 941 2.598 1.720** 493 2.382 1.640 
MB(5-YearTLR) 884 2.345* 1.675 471 2.127 1.635 
Liti (3-YearTLR) 975 0.389 0.000 512 0.422 0.000 
Liti (4-YearTLR) 975 0.372 0.000 512 0.395 0.000 
Liti (5-YearTLR) 975 0.374 0.000 512 0.396 0.000 
AROA 862 -0.025 -0.003 439 -0.010 -0.001 
AOPERROA(t+1 tot-1) 675 -0.022 -0.009 313 -0.018 -0.005 
AOPERROA (t+2 to t-1) 581 -0.015* -0.008 273 -0.001 -0.002 
Deal Value (million$) 903 186.395 40.000*** 493 194.789 59.000 
TobinQ 907 1.539* 1.264** 478 1.451 1.206 
Drop 975 0.197* 0.000* 512 0.158 0.000 
First 975 0.870 1.000 512 0.880 1.000 
Insiders 975 0.114** 0.000** 512 0.075 0.000 
Pay_equity 975 0.068 0.000 512 0.060 0.000 
Noproceeds 975 0.661*** 1.000* 512 0.316 0.000 
Program 975 0.228 0.000 512 0.241 0.000 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for variables used in the tests. Car (3-Day) is the three day cumulative 
abnormal return that is firm stock return minus value-weighted market return over the [-1 ,+1] window with asset sale , 
announcement date being 0; E/P is the accumulated income before extraordinary items (data item 'IB') over the 
aggregation period (3 or 4 or 5 years) scaled by the market value of equity (item PRCC_F*item CSHO) at the 
beginning of the aggregation period; R is the buy-and-hold returns over the fiscal years of the specific aggregation 
period; D is the dummy variable that is equal to one if the corresponding R is less than zero; Total assets is book 
value of total assets (item AT) measured at the beginning of the aggregation period; Leverage is book value of debt 
(item DLC+item DLTT) to book value of total assets measured at the beginning of the aggregation period; MB is 
market value of equity to book value of equity (item CEQ) measured at the beginning of the aggregation perio^, Liti is 
the dummy for high litigation risk years if at the beginning of the aggregation period the calendar year does not fall in 
the 1980-1981, 1986-1987, or 1992-2001 periods; AROA is the average of ROAs o f two fiscal years after asset sale 
announcement fiscal year minus the average of ROAs o f two fiscal years before asset sale announcement fiscal year, 
and ROA is income before extraordinary items scaled by book value of total assets; AOPERROA is pre*event 
performance-matched Operating ROA; Operating ROA is operating income before depreciation (item OIBDP) scaled 
by book value of total assets; sample firms are matched with median performance of firms within the same twonjigit 
SIC code whose earnings fall into the ± 10% range of sample firms' Operating ROA in the fiscal year before asset 
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sale announcement; AOPERROAt+1.2 is equal to [(OPERROAt+1,2-median of control firms 
OPERROA,+1,2) - (OPERROA, - i -med ian of control firms OPERROA,.i)]; Deal Value is transaction value coded by 
SDC database; TobinQ is book value of total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of common stock 
minus deferred taxes (item TXDB) scaled by book value of total assets; Drop is equal to 1 if in the fiscal year of 
announcement the selling firms simultaneously drop at least one business segment; First is equal to 1 if the asset 
sale is a stand-alone deal or the first deal in a asset sale program; Insiders is equal to 1 if the acquirer party involves 
insiders of selling firm; Pay_equity is equal to 1 if the consideration mixture acquirer pays includes acquirer's own 
stocks; Noproceeds is equal to 1 if the selling firm does not disclose the use of proceeds from asset sale; Program is 
equal to 1 i f t he asset sale deal belongs to a broader restructuring program. In panel B, *, **, *** mean that there's 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Car and Post-divestiture Performance Change based on Reason Breakdown 
Panel A: Full Sample 
AOPERROAAOPERROA 
3-Day Car AROA (t+1 to t-1) (t+2 to t-1) 
Reason N Obs Mean Mean Mean Mean 
refocus ^ 0.020*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.013** 
performance 252 0.025*** -0.045*** -0.026** -0.021** 
untypical 
divestiture 179 0.034*** 0.015 -0.017 -0.003 
debt 123 0.034*** -0.004 -0.002 0.013 
N/A 42 0.010 0.013 -0.023 -0.012 
expansions 34 0.045*** -0.037* -0.031 -0.024 
anti-takeover 26 0.005 -0.031** 0.034 -0.005 
strengthen 
balance sheet 25 -0.002 -0.068 0.023 0.011 
shift focus 22 0.007 -0.172** -0.154** 0.000 
raise cash 21 0.016 0.028 0.032 0.064* 
turnaround 13 0.065 0.055 0.038 0.004 
good price 10 0.086 -0.037 -0.070 -0.005 
undervalue 7 0.033* -0.008 -0.004 -0.031*** 
national trend 1 -0.081 -0.015 -0.017 -0.032 
high union wage 1 0.100 0.083 0.109 0.132 
volatility 1 0.087 0.007 NA NA 
Total ^ ^ 0.024*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.010*** 
Panel B: Non-Performance-Driven Sample 
AOPERROAAOPERROA 
3-Day Car AROA (t+1 to t-1) (t+2 to t-1) 
Reason N Obs Mean Mean Mean Mean 
untypical 
divestiture 179 0.034*** 0.015 -0.017 -0.003 
debt 112 0.033*** -0.005 -0.005 0.014 
refocus 50 0.019 -0.010 -0.012 0.000 
expansions 32 0.050*** -0.039* -0.032 -0.027 
anti-takeover 23 0.009 -0.039*** 0.025 -0.023 
strengthen 
balance sheet 23 -0.007 -0.088 0.005 -0.011 
N/A 22 0.013 0.002 -0.038 -0.013 
raise cash 20 0.020 0.030 0.033 0.069* 
shift focus 19 0.007 -0.177** -0.160** 0.005 
turnaround 12 0.044 0.048 0.038 0.004 
good price 10 0.086 -0.037 -0.070 -0.005 
undervalue 7 0.033* -0.008 -0.004 -0.031*** 
high union wage 1 0.100 -0.015 -0.017 -0.032 
nationaltrend 1 -0.081 0.083 0.109 0.132 
volatility 1 0.087 0.007 NA NA 
Total ^ 0.029*** -0.010 -0.018** -0.001 
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Panel C: Performance-Driven Sample 
AOPERROAAOPERROA 
3-Day Car AROA (t+1tot-1) ( t+2tot-1) 
Reason N Obs Mean Mean Mean Mean 
refocus 680 0.020*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.014** 
performance 252 0.025*** -0.045*** -0.026** -0.021** 
N/A 20 0.006 0.024 -0.006 -0.010 
debt 11 0.048* -0.003 0.031 -0.011 
anti-takeover 3 -0.027 0.029 0.168 0.246 
shift focus 3 0.002 -0.078 -0.055 -0.053 
expansions 2 -0.038 -0.011 -0.012 0.047 
strengthen balance 
sheet 2 0.053 0.134 0.146 0.171 
raise cash 1 -0.058 0.003 0.014 0.019 
turnaround 1 0.314 0.123 NA NA 
Total 975 0.021*** -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.015*** 
Panel D: Untypical Divestitures 
AOPERROA AOPERROA 
3-Day Car AROA (t+1 to t-1) (t+2 to t-1) 
Reason N Obs Mean Mean Mean Mean 
strategic alliance 45 0.055*** 0.022 -0.010 -0.013 
antitrust 25 0.026** -0.002 -0.015 -0.022 
real estate 25 0.008 -0.014 -0.005 -0.010 
bankruptcy 15 0.072** 0.053 0.005 -0.001 
sale-leaseback 14 0.015 -0.081 -0.060 0.020 
liquidation 12 0.058 0.077 -0.073 0.031 
nonoperating assets 9 -0.005 0.106* -0.008 -0.036 
chapter11 8 0.006 0.135** 0.068 0.078 
assets swap 6 0.029 0.046* 0.073** 0.095* 
delisted 3 0.131* 0.147* 0.117 0.246 
less than majority 3 0.128 -0.077 -0.028 -0.050* 
franchise 2 0.016 -0.062 -0.043 NA 
going concern 2 0.061 -0.359 -0.406 -0.221 
relocation 2 0.004 0.050 0.002 0.007 
donation 1 -0.010 0.004 -0.033 0.039 
negative net worth 1 -0.105 0.101 NA NA 
remove conflict of 
interest 1 -0.019 NA NA NA 
repurchase 
previously sold 1 -0.032 NA NA NA 
reverse takeover 1 -0.011 -0.426 -0.288 -0.261 
seller being acquired 1 NA NA NA NA • 
settlement with the 
government 1 -0.050 0.028 0.021 0.004 ‘ 
truce agreement 1 0.010 -0.184 NA NA 
Total 179 0.034*** 0.015 -0.017 -0.003 
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Table 4 reports the Car and performance based on the breakdown of reasons claimed by the selling firms for the full 
sample, performance^jr iven sample, non-performance-driven sample and untypical d ivest i tures.Adeal is classified as 
performance-driven if the divested assets show bad performance before being divested, or f irms claim that they sell 
assets to "refocus" but provide no information on the profitability of divested assets. The rest o f t h e sample is defined 
as non-performance-driven. Untypical divestitures are deals where firms do not sell voluntarily for money in exchange, 
or any other deals not in the traditional divestiture sense. Reason is what firms claim why they sell assets in the 
divestiture announcement. I search the divestiture announcements in Factiva around the announcement date (DA in 
SDC database), and coded the reason by reading the comments from selling firms' management, buying firms' 
management, financial analysts or reporters for relevant news reports. Car (3-Day) is the three day cumulative 
abnormal return that is f irm stock return minus value-weighted market return over the [-1,+1] window with asset sale 
announcement date being 0; AROA is the average of ROAs of two fiscal years after asset sale announcement fiscal 
year minus the average of ROAs of two fiscal years before asset sale announcement fiscal year, and ROA is income 
before extraordinary items scaled by book value of total assets; AOPERROA is pre-event performance-matched 
Operating ROA; Operating ROA is operating income before depreciation (item OIBDP) scaled by book value of total 
assets; sample firms are matched with median performance of firms within the same two-digit SIC code whose 
earnings fall into the 土 10% range of sample firms' Operating ROA in the fiscal year before asset sale 
announcement; AOPERROAt+1,2 is equal to [(OPERROAi+1,2"fnedian of control firms 
OPERROA,+1,2) - (OPERROA, . i -med ian of control firms OPERROA,.i)]. 
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Table 4 
Car and Post-divestiture Performance Change based on Proceeds Breakdown 
Panel A: Full Sample 
AOPERROAAOPERROA 
3-Day CarAROA (t+1 to t-1) (H2 to t-1) 
Proceeds N Obs Mean Mean Mean Mean 
N/A 971 0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.009* 
debt 320 0.035*** -0.021** -0.016* -0.008 
expansions 81 0.033*** -0.041** -0.043*** -0.030** 
repurchase 43 0.026** -0.029 -0.028* -0.044** 
acquisitions 40 0.014* 0.001 -0.011 -0.011 
dividend 16 0.069** -0.015 -0.015 0.020 
general corporate 13 0.020 -0.010 -0.061 -0.026 
restructuring 3 0.002 -0.013 0.068* 0.075** 




3-Day CarAROA (t+1 to t-1) (t+2 to t-1) 
Proceeds N Obs Mean Mean Mean Mean 
N/A 325 0.024*** -0.001 -0.008 0.005 
debt 132 0.036*** -0.028* -0.037** -0.003 
expansions 22 0.063*** -0.035 -0.067** -0.036 
acquisitions 13 0.007 -0.011 -0.033 -0.030 
repurchase 8 0.022 0.003 0.010 -0.056 
dividend 7 0.087* -0.038 -0.019 -0.054 
restructuring 3 0.002 -0.013 0.068* 0.075** 
generalcorporate 2 -0.061 -0.031 -0.178 -0.098 
Total 512 0.029*** -0.010 -0.018** -0.001 
Panel C: Performance-Driven Sample 
AOPERROAAOPERROA 
3-Day CarAROA (t+1 to t-1) (t+2 to t-1) 
Proceeds N Obs Mean Mean Mean Mean 
N/A 646 0.017*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.015** 
debt 188 0.034*** -0.016 -0.005 -0.011 
expansions 59 0.022* -0.043* -0.037** -0.029* 
repurchase 35 0.028** -0.037 -0.037** -0.042* 
acquisitions 27 0.018* 0.007 -0.001 -0.002 
generalcorporate 11 0.035 -0.006 -0.048 -0.018 
dividend 9 0.054 0.003 -0.012 0.094 • 
Total 975 0.021*** -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.015*** 
Table 5 reports Table 4 reports the Car and performance based on the breakdown of proceeds claimed by the selling 
firms for the full sample, performance-driven sample, non-performance<lriven sample and untypical divestitures. A 
deal is classified as performance<!riven if the divested assets show bad performance before being divested, or firms 
claim that they sell assets to "refocus" but provide no information on the profitability of divested assets. The rest of the 
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sample is defined as non-performance-driven. Untypical divestitures are deals where firms don't sell voluntarily for 
money in exchange, or any other deals not in the traditional divestiture sense. Proceeds is what f irms claim how they 
are going to use the proceeds from the asset sales. I search the divestiture announcements in Factiva around the 
announcement date (DA in SDC database), and coded the use of proceeds by reading the comments from selling 
firms' management, financial analysts or reporters for relevant news reports. Car (3-Day) is the three day cumulative 
abnormal return that is firm stock return minus value-weighted market return over the [-1,+1] window with asset sale 
announcement date being 0; AROA is the average of ROAs of two fiscal years after asset sale announcement fiscal 
year minus the average of ROAs of two fiscal years before asset sale announcement fiscal year, and ROA is income 
before extraordinary items scaled by book value of total assets; AOPERROA is pre-event performance-matched 
Operating ROA; Operating ROA is operating income before depreciation (item OIBDP) scaled by book value of total 
assets; sample firms are matched with median performance of firms within the same two-digit SIC code whose 
earnings fall into the d i 10% range of sample firms' Operating ROA in the fiscal year before asset sale 
announcement; AOPERROAt+1,2 is equal to [(OPERROAt+1,2-median of control firms 
OPERROA,+1,2) - ( O P E R R O A n - m e d i a n of control firms OPERROA,.i)] . 
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Table 4 
OLS Regression of the Relation between Selling Firm Announcement Car and Conservatism 
^,-i,-y 丨P.-j-x = ^ + AA-. ,- , + M � , - j + AA-,.,-y *(v-) + ACar' + (3,Car, *D,_,_,_. 
+ (3,Car, * R,_�,_j + p,Car, * D,_, ,_j * R,_, ,_j + P,Lev,_j_, 
+ ft"v,_)_,*D,_i,_) +Ao^ev,_,_,*i?,_,,_,+/3„Lev,_,_,*A_,,_/i?,_,,_, 
^P,,Size,_j_, + P,,Size,_j_, * D,_, ,_j + P,,Size,^j_, * i ? , _ „ _ , 
+ ^^sSize,_j_, *D,_,,_j *R,_,,_. + p,,MB,_j_, + (3,,MB,_._, * A-,.,-y 
+ P^m-j -^ * R,-^,-j + A9^5,-.-, * A-,,-； * R.-u.-j + P20Liti,.j., 
+ ft,Z/",_)_i * D,_,,_j + A//r/,_,_, * i?,_,,_, + P2,Liti,_^., * A-i’,-, * ^-. ,- , + ^ 
Panel A: 3-Day Car-Non performance related deals 
Variable Aggregated over 3 years Aggregated over 4 years Aggregated over 5 years 
Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 
Intercept -1.121 0.007 -0.975 <.0001 -0.660 0.165 
D 0.167 0.670 0.627 0.108 0.702 0.196 
R 0.221 0.340 0.604 <.0001 0.577 0.013 
D*R -0.984 0.095 0.149 0.810 0.867 0.372 
Car -0.046 0.964 0.653 0.418 1.233 0.125 
Car*D 1.687 0.231 -0.728 0.532 -0.670 0.682 
Car*R 0.382 0.408 0.075 0.745 -0.288 0.517 
^ D * R 2.449 0.142 0.177 0.895 1.726 0.443 
Lev 0.532 0.115 0.506 0.076 0.485 0.419 
Lev*D -0.248 0.641 -1.260 0.054 -3.000 0.021 
Lev*R -0.268 0.368 -0.347 0.012 -0.597 0.022 
Lev*D*R 2.418 0.007 0.854 0.406 -1.511 0.458 
Size 0.089 0.014 0.100 <.0001 0.088 0.041 
Size*D -0.031 0.498 -0.036 0.466 -0.017 0.821 
Size*R -0.002 0.935 -0.049 0.024 -0.036 0.240 
Size*D*R 0.102 0.230 0.088 0.268 0.103 0.491 
MB -0.002 0.956 0.017 0.346 -0.054 0.255 
MB*D 0.059 0.158 0.005 0.868 0.155 0.086 
MB*R 0.003 0.951 -0.027 0.183 0.025 0.525 
MB*D*R 0.026 0.725 -0.057 0.323 -0.107 0.415 
Liti -0.025 0.806 -0.005 0.957 0.331 0.028 
Liti*D 0.121 0.546 0.001 0.996 0.221 0.524 
Liti*R 0.060 0.533 0.060 0.402 -0.148 0.090 
Liti*D*R 0.443 0.222 0.317 0.395 1.562 0.025 
Industry 丫 
Dummy ^es 
N 498 481 460 
Adjusted R^ (%)43.62% 58.73% 53.44% 
« 
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Panel B: 3-Day Car-Performance related deals 
Variable Aggregated over 3 years Aggregated over 4 years Aggregated over 5 years 
Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 
Intercept -0.005 0.977 0.418 0.047 0.395 0.210 
D -0.035 0.815 0.144 0.475 0.005 0.990 
R -0.140 0.116 -0.135 0.298 -0.144 0.501 
D*R 0.822 0.005 0.851 0.012 1.476 0.034 
Car -0.322 0.376 -0.926 0.117 0.100 0.908 
Car*D 0.154 0.751 0.381 0.574 -1.506 0.184 
Car*R 0.176 0.582 0.871 0.028 0.354 0.650 
Car*D*R -0.051 0.939 -1.483 0.044 -2.488 0.081 
Lev -0.192 0.222 -0.179 0.329 -0.175 0.549 
Lev*D 0.105 0.704 0.042 0..912 0.268 0.693 
Lev*R 0.439 0.002 0.266 0.004 0.323 0.117 
Lev*D*R -0.187 0.679 -0.159 0.776 0.794 0.531 
Size 0.001 0.941 0.035 0.060 0.015 0.589 
Size*D 0.003 0.903 -0.045 0.095 -0.031 0.545 
Size*R 0.023 0.074 0.014 0.350 0.018 0.380 
Size*D*R -0.046 0.279 -0.039 0.369 -0.102 0.359 
MB 0.001 0.834 -0.013 0.266 -0.046 0.119 
MB*D 0.000 0.976 0.021 0.240 0.054 0.160 
MB*R -0.014 0.102 -0.003 0.795 0.013 0.690 
MB*D*R -0.030 0.197 -0.018 0.497 -0.090 0.176 
Liti 0.059 0.182 -0.092 0.127 -0.206 0.005 
Liti*D -0.114 0.209 0.065 0.570 0.113 0.492 
Liti*R -0.052 0.309 0.121 0.050 0.205 0.003 
Liti*D*R 0.262 0.132 0.283 0.175 0.035 0.927 
Industry 丫 
Dummy 
N 940 907 853 
Adjusted R^ (%)40.01% 43.47% 41:22% 
Table 6 reports the multivariate OLS regression of timely loss recognition model aggregated over 3, 4 and 5 years and 
the 3-day Car of selling firms. A deal is classified as perfomnance*driven if the divested assets show bad performance 
before being divested, or firms claim that they sell assets to "refocus" but provide no information on the profitability of 
divested assets. The rest of the sample is defined as non-performance<lriven. The dependent variable E/P is the 
accumulated income before extraordinary items (data item 'IB') over the aggregation period (3 or 4 or 5 years) scaled 
by the market value of equity (item PRCC_F*item CSHO) at the beginning of the aggregation period; Car (3-Day) is 
the three day cumulative abnormal return that is firm stock return minus value-weighted market return over the [-1,+1] 
window with asset sale announcement date being 0; R is the buy-and-hold returns over the fiscal years of the specific 
aggregation period; D is the dummy variable that is equal to one if the corresponding R is less than zero; Lev is book 
value of debt (item DLC+item DLTT) to book value of total assets measured at the beginning of the aggregation period; 
Size is logarithm of book value of total assets (item AT) at the beginning of the aggregation period; MB is market value 
of equity to book value of equity (item CEQ) measured at the beginning of the aggregation period; Liti is the dummy for 
high litigation risk years if at the beginning o f the aggregation period the calendar year does not fall in the 1980-1981, 
1986-1987, or 1992-2001 periods. All the p-values are based on robust standard errors clustered at firm level. 
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Table 4 
OLS Regression of the Relation between Selling Firm Post-divestiture Performance Change and Conservatism 
E,^u-j' Pt-j-x = « + PA-u-j + A^-i.-y + PA-u-j * ^-1.-； + P,^erform^ + perform, * D,_,,_^ 
+ P,APerform^ *J^—��. +d^APerform, * D , _ , , _ / i ^ _ , ,_^. +P,Lev^_^_, 
+ f^9Lev,_j_, *D^_,,_j +^,,Lev^_j_,*I^_,,_j+(3,,Lev,_^_, * A - u - / ( u i 
+ PnSize,-M +PnSize,-M *A-u-y +A4^^^^,-,-,*^-u-y 
W i z e , + x *D�*,R^_”_j +钱6爐 ,十1 +钱7爐 ,十1 *A-i,-y 
+ A 8 ^ , - y - l * W y +/^9湖丨十、*A-u-/W. + A / ^ - y - i 
+ PnLiti,-M *Q-i,-y +线2丄衍,十1*代命)+线3丄衍,十1 * Q - i , - ; * ^ - i , - , + g 
Panel A: AROA as Performance Measure-Non Performance Related Deals 
Variable Aggregated over 3 years Aggregated over 4 years Aggregated over 5 years 
Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 
Intercept -0.996 0.014 -0.750 0.003 -0.132 0.800 
D 0.258 0.406 0.286 0.461 0.322 0.509 
R 0.399 0.037 0.471 <.0001 0.390 0.001 
D*R -0.633 0.257 0.099 0.871 1.203 0.227 
AROA -1.857 0.013 -0.165 0.825 0.968 0.593 
AROA*D 2.900 0.004 0.125 0.913 -0.988 0.626 
AROA*R 0.049 0.926 -0.478 0.473 -0.388 0.579 
AROA*D*R 2.037 0.244 0.745 0.361 0.733 0.618 
Lev 0.465 0.197 0.085 0.772 -0.162 0.776 
Lev*D 0.035 0.948 -1.045 0.107 -2.725 0.062 
Lev*R -0.407 0.340 -0.019 0.916 -0.008 0.961 
Lev*D*R 2.238 0.017 0.039 0.969 -2.592 0.259 
Size 0.069 0.004 0.077 0.000 0.039 0.237 
Size*D -0.042 0.273 -0.003 0.954 0.037 0.597 
Size*R -0.015 0.521 -0.043 0.005 -0.018 0.248 
Size*D*R 0.077 0.359 0.112 0.153 0.075 0.617 
MB -0.008 0.731 0.012 0.569 0.011 0.731 
MB*D 0.043 0.266 0.011 0.740 0.051 0.499 
MB*R -0.023 0.506 -0.033 0.017 -0.065 0.001 
MB*D*R 0.012 0.865 -0.025 0.647 -0.024 0.834 
Liti 0.049 0.560 0.056 0.536 0.097 0.478 
Liti*D 0.054 0.759 0.017 0.936 0.672 0.082 
Liti*R -0.012 0.907 0.056 0.334 0.003 0.962 
Liti*D*R 0.610 0.122 0.499 0.201 1.981 0.019 
Industry Dummy Yes 
N 456 440 421 ’ 
Adjusted R^ (%) 51.58% 64.27% 61.89% 
< 
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Panel B: AROA as Performance Measure-Performance Related Deals '； 
Variable Aggregated over 3 years Aggregated over 4 years Aggregated over 5 y e a r ^ 
Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 一 
Intercept 0.060 0.585 0.173 0.422 0.575 0.071 
D -0.087 0.570 -0.083 0.707 -0.358 0.389 
R -0.081 0.242 -0.151 0.293 -0.205 0.353 
D*R 0.554 0.020 0.721 0.045 1.140 0.065 
AROA -0.669 0.020 -0.334 0.298 -0.332 0.457 
AROA*D 0.052 0.894 -0.847 0.085 -1.700 0.100 
AROA*R -0.029 0.819 -0.108 0.631 -0.286 0.108 
ARQA*D*R -0.607 0.127 -1.063 0.045 -1.889 0.111 一 
Lev -0.145 0.362 -0.215 0.309 -0.282 0.367 ^ 
Lev*D 0.017 0.954 0.265 0.499 0.699 0.304 ‘ 
Lev*R 0.343 0.007 0.240 . 0.017 0.249 0.195 
Lev*D*R -0.088 0.855 0.316 0.595 1.750 0.204 
Size 0.005 0.682 0.025 0.208 0.000 .0.987 
Size*D 0.014 0.508 -0.026 0.349 0.004 0.942 、, 
Size*R 0.019 0.115 0.014 0.303 0.027 0.221 
Size*D*R -0.018 0.621 -0.047 0.260 -0.098 0.299 
MB 0.003 0.649 -0.017 0.161 -0.044 0.150 
MB*D -0.008 0.532 0.024 0.133 0.039 0.311 ‘ 
MB*R -0.024 0.067 -0.005 0.605 0.003 0.931 
MB*D*R -0.019 0.439 -0.013 0.611 -0.096 0.108 
Liti 0.078 0.074 -0.107 0.092 -0.240 0.004 
Liti*D -0.139 0.146 0.059 0.627 0.151 0.344 
Liti*R -0.088 0.069 0.154 0.027 0.261 0.001 
Liti*D*R 0.289 0.140 0.114 0.597 -0.206 0.535 
Industry Dummy Yes 
N 857 826 776 





Panel C: AOPERROAt” as Performance Measure-Non Performance Related Deals 
Variable Aggregated over 3 years Aggregated over 4 years Aggregated over 5 years 
Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 
Intercept -1.078 0.008 -0.814 0.006 0.093 0.877 
D 0.048 0.897 0.267 0.576 -0.035 0.949 
R 0.440 0.019 0.449 0.000 0.243 0.097 
D*R -0.719 0.331 0.513 0.511 1.186 0.286 
AOPERROAt+i -1.433 0.169 0.869 0.168 3.960 0.039 
AOPERROAt+i*D 3.353 0.008 -0.814 0.544 -3.019 0.181 
AOPERROAt+i*R 0.835 0.428 -0.780 0.079 -1.854 0.025 
AOPERROAt+i*D*R 2.589 0.140 0.753 0.631 2.520 0.173 
Lev 0.697 0.127 0.362 0.379 -0.317 0.669 
Lev*D -0.065 0.930 -1.719 0.028 -2.680 0.133 
Lev*R -0.776 0.120 -0.159 0.546 0.074 0.708 
Lev*D*R 2.812 0.033 -0.739 0.532 -2.201 0.420 
Size 0.047 0.080 0.061 0.020 0.014 0.702 
Size*D -0.003 0.958 0.002 0.966 0.064 0.508 
Size*R -0.013 0.464 -0.034 0.078 0.004 0.831 
Size*D*R 0.140 0.259 0.101 0.312 0.018 0.930 
MB 0.000 0.989 0.015 0.538 0.047 0.320 
MB*D 0.046 0.411 0.031 0.621 0.094 0.260 
MB*R -0.007 0.874 -0.041 0.017 -0.090 <.0001 
MB*D*R 0.003 0.976 -0.058 0.493 0.092 0.411 
Liti 0.022 0.829 0.032 0.777 0.158 0.272 
Liti*D -0.056 0.802 0.017 0.944 0.947 0.027 
Liti*R 0.070 0.573 0.098 0.262 0.029 0.603 
Liti*D*R 0.221 0.660 0.439 0.306 2.481 0.006 
Industry Dummy Yes 
N 322 312 297 




Panel D: AOPERROAt+i as Performance Measure-Performance Related Deals _^ , 
Variable Aggregated over 3 years Aggregated over 4 years Aggregated over 5 years_ 
Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 一 
Intercept 0.083 0.377 0.458 0.007 0.664 0.028 ) 
D 0.097 0.413 -0.203 0.360 -0.144 0.708 
R -0.082 0.289 -0.176 0.215 -0.255 0.260 
D*R 0.811 <.0001 0.650 0.118 1.648 0.004 
AOPERROAt+i -0.077 0.825 -0.193 0.602 -0.224 0.702 
AOPERROAt+i*D -0.126 0.757 -0.480 0.462 0.075 0.932 
AOPERROAt+i*R -0.209 0.485 -0.119 0.761 -0.355 0.334 
AOPERROAt+i*D*R -0.428 0.347 -0.757 0.372 -0.194 0.858 J 
Lev -0.224 0.212 -0.304 0.191 -0.523 0.111 ’ 
Lev*D 0.397 0.223 0.285 0.529 1.035 0.122 
Lev*R 0.411 0.005 0.290 0.006 0.357 0.102 
Lev*D*R 0.235 0.686 0.006 0.993 1.755 0.192 
Size 0.007 0.582 0.013 0.442 -0.009 0.753 
Size*D -0.017 0.392 -0.013 0.654 -0.044 0.366 
Size*R 0.015 0.272 0.014 0.264 0.032 0.163 
Size*D*R -0.038 0.278 -0.020 0.689 -0.183 0.065 
MB 0.002 0.842 -0.024 0.120 -0.056 0.113 
MB*D -0.001 0.912 0.035 0.112 0.055 0.223 
MB*R -0.017 0.251 0.000 0.977 0.011 0.777 
MB*D*R -0.031 0.258 -0.017 0.605 -0.096 0.150 
Liti 0.075 0.150 -0.056 0.392 -0.211 0.013 
Liti*D -0.166 0.065 0.010 0.939 0.111 0.476 
Liti*R -0.065 0.192 0.134 0.055 0.238 0.001 
Liti*D*R 0.187 0.358 0.133 0.577 -0.350 0.251 
Industry Dummy Yes 
N 671 644 606 






Panel E: AOPERROAH2 as Performance Measure-Non Performance Related Deals 
Variable Aggregated over 3 years Aggregated over 4 years Aggregated over 5 years 
Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 
Intercept -0.864 0.107 -0.615 0.036 0.263 0.692 
D 0.029 0.941 0.467 0.350 -0.261 0.657 
R 0.355 0.098 0.514 0.000 0.267 0.038 
D*R -0.007 0.993 0.524 0.529 0.953 0.426 
AOPERROAt+2 -0.903 0.464 0.590 0.401 -0.730 0.520 
AOPERROAt+2*D 1.016 0.659 -3.061 0.076 1.982 0.418 
AOPERROAt+2*R 0.449 0.727 -0.447 0.261 -0.501 0.204 
AOPERROAt+2*D*R -1.682 0.622 -2.442 0.292 0.782 0.802 
Lev 0.410 0.371 0.476 0.246 0.562 0.164 
Lev*D -0.226 0.806 -2.341 0.018 -2.568 0.056 
Lev*R -0.718 0.178 -0.149 0.605 -0.066 0.597 
Lev*D*R 1.477 0.325 -1.113 0.426 -1.128 0.631 
Size 0.031 0.248 0.062 0.023 0.011 0.766 
Size*D 0.005 0.918 -0.008 0.898 0.038 0.690 
Size*R -0.011 0.553 -0.049 0.025 0.001 0.923 
Size*D*R 0.146 0.227 0.126 0.270 -0.011 0.955 
MB 0.002 0.952 -0.019 0.452 -0.017 0.640 
MB*D 0.014 0.844 0.043 0.500 0.191 0.024 
MB*R -0.014 0.778 -0.022 0.243 -0.080 <.0001 
MB*D*R -0.144 0.423 -0.086 0.355 0.130 0.248 
Liti 0.006 0.962 0.029 0.780 0.074 0.577 
Liti*D -0.042 0.872 0.075 0.779 0.918 0.075 
Liti*R 0.105 0.476 0.072 0.360 0.029 0.587 
Uti*D*R 0.226 0.682 0.386 0.498 2.215 0.059 
Industry Dummy Yes 
N 281 272 260 




Panel F: AOPERROAt+2 as Performance Measure-Performance Related Deals • 
Variable Aggregated over 3 years Aggregated over 4 years Aggregated over 5 y e a r s _， 
Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 一 
Intercept 0.077 0.411 0.300 0.152 0.856 0.028 
D -0.046 0.755 -0.013 0.963 -0.619 0.295 ， 
R -0.106 0.221 -0.148 0.346 -0.243 0.375 ‘ 
D*R 0.673 0.007 0.725 0.122 1.054 0.220 
AOPERROAt+2 -0.300 0.197 - 0 . 6 1 1 0.236 - 0 . 1 2 6 0.823 
AOPERROAt+2*D -0.848 0.132 0.774 0.288 -1.302 0.368 | 
AOPERROAt.2*R -0.196 0.282 -0.199 0.571 -0.701 0.068 
AOPERROAt+2*D*R-1.463 0.098 0.767 0.398 -1.508 0.415 一 
Lev -0.273 0.201 -0.192 0.496 -0.664 0.069 
Lev*D 0.371 0.321 0.068 0.895 1.499 0.056 “ 
Lev*R 0.424 0.016 0.093 0.478 0.386 0.109 
Lev*D*R -0.044 0.944 0.116 0.887 2.260 0.117 
Size 0.004 0.755 0.024 0.298 -0.012 0.720 
Size*D 0.013 0.600 -0.033 0.343 0.009 0.893 ^ 
Size*R 0.019 0.169 0.011 0.473 0.035 0.162 
Size*D*R -0.010 0.816 -0.035 0.520 -0.156 0.193 
MB -0.004 0.731 -0.030 0.156 -0.043 0.253 
MB*D -0.019 0.314 0.037 0.151 0.037 0.426 * 
MB*R -0.020 0.151 0.002 0.900 -0.018 0.630 
MB*D*R -0.043 0.196 -0.013 0.714 -0.058 0.390 
Liti 0.092 0.121 -0.097 0.196 -0.144 0.159 
Liti*D -0.196 0.088 0.055 0.691 0.005 0.981 j 
Liti*R -0.060 0.315 0.237 0.001 0.224 0.013 
Liti*D*R 0.006 0.977 -0.103 0.724 -0.167 0.640 
Industry Dummy Yes 
N 577 555 520 j 
Adjusted R^ (%) 38.00% 42.59% 47.91% 一 
Table 7 reports the multivariate OLS regression of timely loss recognition model aggregated over 3, 4 and 5 years and 
the post-divestiture performance change of selling firms. A deal is classified as performance-driven if the divested 
assets show bad performance before being divested, or firms claim that they sell assets to "refocus" but provide no 
information on the profitability of divested assets. The rest of the sample is defined as non-performance-driven. The 
dependent variable E/P is the accumulated income before extraordinary items (data item ‘IB’）over the aggregation ； 
period (3 or 4 or 5 years) scaled by the market value of equity (item PRCC_F*item CSHO) at the beginning of the j 
aggregation period; AROA is the average of ROAs of two fiscal years after asset sale announcement fiscal year minus 
the average of ROAs of two fiscal years before asset sale announcement fiscal year, and ROA is income before 
extraordinary items scaled by book value of total assets; AOPERROA is pre-event performance-matched Operating 
ROA; Operating ROA is operating income before depreciation (item OIBDP) scaled by book value of total assets; 
sample firms are matched with median performance of firms within the same two-digit SIC code whose earnings fall 、 
into the ± 10% range of sample firms' Operating ROA in the fiscal year before asset sale announcement; 
AOPERROAt+1.2 is equal to [(OPERROAt+1,2-median of control firms OPERROAt+1,2) - (OPERROAt- i -median of control 
firms OPERROAt-i)]; R is the buy-and-hold returns over the fiscal years of the specific aggregation period; D is the 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the corresponding R is less than zero; Lev is book value of debt (item DLC+item 、 
DLTT) to book value of total assets measured at the beginning of the aggregation period; Size is logarithm of book ； 
value oftotal assets (item AT) at the beginning o f the aggregation period; MB is market value of equity to book value of 
equity (item CEQ) measured at the beginning o f the aggregation period; Liti is the dummy for high litigation risk years if 
at the beginning of the aggregation period the calendar year does not fall in the 1980-1981, 1986-1987, or 1992-2001 




TLR Models with Interaction of Non-disclosure of Proceeds 
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+/^2oSize,_j_, +A,fe ,_ ,_, *A-i.-, +022Size,-j-i *^-u-j 
+ ^3览己,十1 *D,—、,—,J^_、‘_j +线4竭十1 +线5竭十1*化1,力 
+钱6竭十丨 *J^-u-j +綱力—1*0,_1’,_,*代_1’,力 +As"" , -"1 





Panel A: 3-Day Car interaction wi th Non-disclosure of Proceeds 
Variable Aggregated over 3 years Aggregated over 4 years Aggregated over 5 year 
Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value , 
Intercept -0.174 0.306 0.363 0.107 0.260 0.392 
D -0.034 0.826 0.119 0.568 0.047 0.901 
R -0.082 0.422 -0.111 0.389 -0.038 0.832 
D*R 0.519 0.070 0.710 0.038 1.170 0.070 
Car 0.036 0.970 -1.285 0.160 1.258 0.170 
Car*D 0.110 0.910 0.983 0.364 -1.943 0.283 
Car*R 0.511 0.700 1.909 0.009 0.157 0.849 — 
Car*D*R -0.193 0.896 -2.416 0.046 -1.653 0.523 : 
Noproceeds 0.083 0.081 0.093 0.153 0.194 0.017 
Noproceeds*D 0.008 0.922 -0.007 0.949 -0.056 0.677 
Noproceeds*R -0.062 0.288 -0.080 0.216 -0.147 0.010 
Noproceeds*D*R 0.399 0.009 0.217 0.225 0.414 0.106 
Car*Noproceeds -0.791 0.439 0.668 0.522 -2.072 • 0.134 
Car*Noproceeds*D -0.569 0.670 -1.092 0.385 0.678 0.758 
Car*Noproceeds*R -0.249 0.857 -1.487 0.050 0.374 0.734 一 
Car*Noproceeds*D*R -1.125 0.551 1.329 0.355 -1.543 0.603 , 
Lev -0.158 0.321 -0.187 0.308 -0.155 0.571 
Lev*D 0.107 0.708 0.132 0.753 0.267 0.683 
Lev*R 0.422 0.002 0.316 0.000 0.340 0.071 
Lev*D*R 0.010 0.983 -0.056 0.928 0.859 0.498 
Size 0.001 0.965 0.032 0.091 0.012 0.662 
Size*D 0.001 0.969 -0.044 0.112 -0.030 0.558 
Size*R 0.021 0.094 0.017 0.255 0.019 0.339 
Size*D*R -0.048 0.259 -0.044 0.321 -0.101 0.353 
MB 0.000 0.945 -0.015 0.180 -0.051 0.087 
MB*D 0.002 0.869 0.024 0.166 0.060 0.112 
MB*R -0.012 0.153 0.002 0.890 0.015 0.622 
MB*D*R -0.033 0.161 -0.022 0.397 . -0.090 0.168 
Liti 0.060 0.187 -0.068 0.234 -0.182 0.005 
Liti*D -0.093 0.316 0.051 0.638 0.075 0.648 
Liti*R -0.054 0.306 0.096 0.095 0.183 0.002 
Liti*D*R 0.304 0.083 0.317 0.125 0.011 0.977 
Industry Dummy Yes 
N 940 907' 853 
Adjusted R^ (%) 41.30% 44.95% 42.46% ； 
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Panel B: AROA interaction with Non-disclosure of Proceeds 
Variable Aggregated over 3 years Aggregated over 4 years Aggregated over 5 year 
Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 
Intercept 0.043 0.692 0.185 0.379 0.511 0.093 
D -0.162 0.317 -0.213 0.349 -0.538 0.164 
R -0.054 0.525 -0.163 0.234 -0.084 0.659 
D*R 0.149 0.567 0.407 0.260 0.164 0.793 
AROA -0.616 0.507 1.318 0.130 -1.019 0.269 
AROA*D -0.143 0.884 -2.871 0.011 2.775 0.123 
AROA*R -0.594 0.584 -1.653 0.012 0.081 0.862 
AROA*D*R 0.230 0.858 0.721 0.592 7.233 0.071 
Noproceeds 0.061 0.205 0.055 0.426 0.150 0.065 
Noproceeds*D 0.080 0.348 0.108 0.363 0.095 0.498 
Noproceeds*R -0.028 0.628 -0.037 0.642 -0.154 0.014 
Noproceeds*D*R 0.474 0.004 0.417 0.035 0.866 0.001 
AROA*Noproceeds 0.157 0.879 -1.751 0.059 0.804 0.458 
AROA*Noproceeds*D 0.007 0.995 2.467 0.050 ^ .819 0.029 
AROA*Noproceeds*R 0.535 0.625 1.643 0.017 -0.425 0.367 
AROA*Noproceeds*D*R -0.910 0.512 -1.558 0.301 -9.639 0.028 
Lev -0.114 0.473 -0.187 0.348 -0.272 0.358 
Lev*D 0.069 0.823 0.378 0.369 1.027 0.118 
Lev*R 0.334 0.009 0.308 0.001 0.253 0.174 
Lev*D*R 0.140 0.781 0.478 0.449 2.372 0.081 
Size 0.004 0.725 0.018 0.365 -0.002 0.948 
Size*D 0.017 0.445 -0.021 0.453 0.000 0.997 
Size*R 0.019 0.123 0.019 0.145 0.028 0.189 
Size*D*R -0.012 0.760 -0.050 0.244 -0.099 0.269 
MB 0.003 0.685 -0.022 0.074 -0.045 0.151 
MB*D -0.011 0.417 0.030 0.071 0.058 0.110 
MB*R -0.024 0.060 0.000 0.993 0.003 0.921 
MB*D*R -0.025 0.314 -0.019 0.450 -0.058 0.279 
Liti 0.083 0.050 -0.052 0.388 -0.199 0.007 
Liti*D -0.149 0.114 0.010 0.931 0.102 0.495 
Liti*R -0.091 0.056 0.080 0.212 0.228 0.000 
Liti*D*R 0.298 0.118 0.203 0.370 -0.161 0.611 
Industry Dummy Yes 
N 857 826 776 




Panel C: AOPERROAt+i interaction with Non-disclosure of Proceeds 
Variable Aggregated over 3 years Aggregated over 4 years Aggregated over 5 year 
Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 
Intercept 0.019 0.839 0.378 0.030 0.497 0.077 
D 0.073 0.567 -0.253 0.255 -0.275 0.462 
R -0.055 0.530 -0.144 0.346 -0.140 0.498 
D*R 0.442 0.055 0.288 0.453 0.873 0.135 
AOPERROAt+i 0.282 0.658 -0.192 0.787 -1.097 0.234 
AOPERROAt+i*D -0.388 0.550 0.234 0.856 2.675 0.147 
AOPERROAHi*R -1.145 0.032 -1.035 0.089 -0.158 0.782 
AOPERROA+i*D*R 1.043 0.115 1.694 0.268 3.586 0.221 
Noproceeds 0.081 0.156 0.118 0.099 0.175 0.032 
Noproceeds*D 0.026 0.752 0.050 0.682 0.082 0.558 
Noproceeds*R -0.030 0.621 -0.055 0.520 -0.136 0.040 
Noproceeds*D*R 0.487 0.007 0.512 0.019 0.735 0.007 
AOPERROAt+i*Noproceeds -0.248 0.742 0.148 0.849 0.998 0.388 
AOPERROAt+i*Noproceeds*D 0.069 0.935 -1.097 0.477 -3.002 0.167 
AOPERROAt+i*Noproceeds*R 0.936 0.099 1.023 0.149 -0.180 0.777 ^ 
AOPERROAt+i*Noproceeds*D*R -1.633 0.041 -2.934 0.113 -4.278 0.175 
Lev -0.158 0.395 -0.279 0.229 -0.496 0.127 
Lev*D 0.386 0.271 0.434 0.386 1.130 0.098 
Lev*R 0.392 0.010 0.319 0.001 0.362 0.086 
Lev*D*R 0.498 0.425 0.335 0.652 1.948 0.155 
Size 0.006 0.644 0.008 0.594 -0.010 0.705 
Size*D -0.015 0.435 -0.012 0.674 -0.039 0.398 
Size*R 0.015 0.258 0.016 0.205 0.031 0.148 
Size*D*R -0.039 0.278 -0.023 0.642 -0.169 0.078 
MB 0.001 0.888 -0.024 0.114 -0.056 0.109 
MB*D -0.003 0.850 0.031 0.140 .. 0.067 0.127 
MB*R -0.018 0.215 -0.002 0.889 0.011 0.778 
MB*D*R -0.037 0.175 -0.024 0.468 -0.066 0.309 
Liti 0.075 0.158 -0.023 0.709 -0.171 0.028 
Liti*D -0.166 0.068 -0.018 0.881 0.075 0.613 
Liti*R -0.069 0.173 0.098 0.135 0.205 0.001 
Liti*D*R 0.195 0.314 0.146 0.543 -0.291 0.335 
Industry Dummy Yes 
N 671 644 606 
Adjusted R^ (%) 40.59% 44.56% 47.69% 
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Panel D: AOPERROAt+2 interaction with Non-disclosure of Proceeds 
Variable Aggregated over 3 years Aggregated over 4 years Aggregated over 5 year 
Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value Coeff. p-Value 
Intercept 0.018 0.852 0.221 0.285 0.693 0.053 
D -0.028 0.846 0.012 0.962 -0.495 0.315 
R -0.084 0.424 -0.121 0.443 -0.138 0.560 
D*R 0.412 0.115 0.475 0.237 0.547 0.452 
AOPERROAt+2 0.294 0.644 0.114 0.881 -0.575 0.552 
AOPERROAt+2*D -0.671 0.357 1.128 0.297 2.455 0.081 
AOPERROAt+2*R -0.926 0.267 -1.429 0.085 -0.605 0.450 
AOPERROAt+2*D*R 0.100 0.939 4.092 0.006 3.386 0.091 
Noproceeds 0.054 0.403 0.086 0.264 0.157 0.072 
Noproceeds*D 0.024 0.783 0.036 0.798 -0.101 0.531 
Noproceeds*R -0.018 0.790 -0.054 0.531 -0.131 0.061 
Noproceeds*D*R 0.444 0.026 0.549 0.030 0.652 0.022 
AOPERROAt+2*Noproceeds -0.657 0.338 -0.679 0.488 0.637 0.561 
AOPERROAt+2*Noproceeds*D -0.535 0.585 -1.114 0.417 -5.092 0.007 
AOPERROAt+2*Noproceeds*R 0.763 0.352 1.257 0.148 -0.168 0.836 
AOPERROAt+2*Noproceeds*D*R -2.178 0.167 -4.561 0.006 -6.562 0.012 
Lev -0.226 0.313 -0.157 0.581 -0.610 0.084 
Lev*D 0.299 0.447 0.106 0.851 1.418 0.053 
Lev*R 0.399 0.036 0.111 0.443 0.368 0.107 
Lev*D*R 0.111 0.867 0.322 0.698 2.230 0.097 
Size 0.002 0.882 0.021 0.366 -0.014 0.668 
Size*D 0.011 0.659 -0.039 0.297 0.004 0.945 
Size*R 0.018 0.175 0.012 0.390 0.035 0.149 
Size*D*R -0.020 0.641 -0.049 0.393 -0.151 0.178 
MB -0.003 0.752 -0.032 0.131 -0.047 0.220 
MB*D -0.020 0.269 0.034 0.183 0.049 0.270 
MB*R -0.020 0.145 0.005 0.738 -0.014 0.706 
MB*D*R -0.050 0.131 -0.031 0.332 -0.034 0.574 
Liti 0.095 0.119 -0.072 0.325 -0.107 0.255 
Liti*D -0.174 0.120 0.016 0.907 -0.074 0.715 
Liti*R -0.063 0.290 0.201 0.003 0.196 0.016 
Liti*D*R 0.089 0.663 -0.177 0.558 -0.248 0.470 
Industry Dummy Yes 
N 577 555 520 
Adjusted R^ (%) 39.86% 44.88% 50.07% 
Table 8 reports the multivariate OLS regression of t imely loss recognition model aggregated over 3, 4 and 5 years and ’ 
3-day Car and the post-divestiture performance change of selling firms with interaction of non-disclosure of use of 
proceeds. The dependent variable E/P is the accumulated income before extraordinary items (data item 'IB') over the 
aggregation period (3 or 4 or 5 years) scaled by the market value of equity (item PRCC_F* i tem CSHO) at the 
beginning of the aggregation period; Noproceeds is the dummy variable equal to 1 i f t he sell ing firm does not disclose 
the use of proceeds f rom asset sale; Car (3-Day) is the three day cumulat ive abnormal return that is f irm stock return 
minus value-weighted market return over the [-1 ,+1] window with asset sale announcement date being 0; AROA is the 
average of ROAs of two fiscal years after asset sale announcement fiscal year minus the average of ROAs of ^ o 
fiscal years before asset sale announcement fiscal year, and ROA is income before extraordinary items scaled by 
book value of total assets; AOPERROA is pre-event performance-matched Operat ing ROA; Operat 'ng ROA is 
operating income before depreciat ion (item OIBDP) scaled by book value of total assets; sample firms are matched 
with median performance of f i rms within the same two-digit SIC code whose earnings fall into the ± 1 0 % range of 
sample firms' Operat ing ROA in the fiscal year before asset sale announcement; AOPERROA(+1,2 is equal to 
[(OPERROAt+i.zHnedian of control firms OPERROA,+1.2) ^OPERROA, . iHnec l ian of control f irms OPERROA,.i)] ; R is 
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the buy-and-hold returns over the fiscal years o f the specific aggregation period; D is the dummy variable that is equal 
to one if the corresponding R is less than zero; Lev is book value of debt (item DLC+item DLTT) to book value of total 
assets measured at the beginning of the aggregation period; Size is logarithm of book value of total assets (item AT) at 
the beginning o f the aggregation period; MB is market value o fequ i ty to book value of equity (item CEQ) measured at 
the beginning of the aggregation period; Liti is the dummy for high litigation risk years if at the beginning of the 
aggregation period the calendar year does not fall in the 1980-1981’ 1986-1987, or 1992-2001 periods. All the 
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